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1. See, e.g., CHARLES CALEB COLTON, LACON: OR, MANY THINGS IN FEW WORDS;
ADDRESSED TO THOSE WHO THINK § CCXVII, 114 (1824) (asserting that “[i]mitation is
the sincerest of flattery”). The sentiment has been expressed elsewhere, of course, but
Colton’s is a relatively early formulation.
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Imitation may be the most sincere form of flattery,1 but in
the language of the law, the demarcation between imitation and
wholesale borrowing remains opaque. This is especially true in
the Supreme Court’s opinion-construction process. This article
examines the implications of the Court’s use of substantive
language directly from merits briefs. To do this, the article
critically analyzes the relationship between merits briefs and
opinions, focusing on instances in which there is strong evidence
that briefs played a substantial role in the Court’s choice of
majority-opinion language. The analysis compares phrasing
from briefs and opinions and locates a case type in which briefs
have played an especially influential role.
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While there is an expectation among those experienced in
Supreme Court practice that language from briefs will seep into
the Court’s opinions,2 there is considerable variation in the
extent and types of overlapping language. Maybe due to this
expectation, there is minimal scholarship dedicated to examining
instances of high levels of language sharing between Supreme
Court opinions and the sources of opinion language such as
merits briefs, as well the normative consequences of this
language-sharing practice.3 To help explain the variation in
shared language from case to case, this article contains a
typology of relationships between briefs and opinions and
presents examples of the different types before focusing on the
brief-opinion relationship in which briefs play the greatest role:
what I characterize as cases having “Lifted” opinions.
The manner in which Justices and their clerks utilize
language from merits briefs in Supreme Court opinions shows
distinct practices across Justices’ chambers and across time. By
inquiring into the inputs for the information and wording in
Supreme Court opinions, we may begin to better understand the
opinion-construction process in a fashion that interviews with
clerks and Justices alone cannot convey.4
Recent evidence shows that from 1946 through 2013,
Supreme Court opinions shared 9.55 percent of their language,
on average, with individual merits briefs.5 That analysis of
38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 15 Side B
11/10/2016 09:41:10

2. See, e.g., TODD C. PEPPERS & ARTEMUS WARD, IN CHAMBERS: STORIES OF
SUPREME COURT LAW CLERKS AND THEIR JUSTICES (2012); DAVID L. WEIDEN &
ARTEMUS WARD, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 206 (2006) (indicating that Justice Stewart might ask a
clerk to “‘[w]rite an opinion along the lines of the United States brief’ or ‘the petitioner’s
brief’”); Karl N. Llewellyn, A Lecture on Appellate Advocacy, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 627, 638
(1962) (declaring that “your brief ought to . . . offer the court something that it can lift,
verbatim, into the opinion taking care of all prior authority, phrasing the whole
satisfactorily, and applying it to the case in hand”).
3. See e.g. Adam Liptak, Clarence Thomas, A Supreme Court Justice of Few Words,
Some of Them Others’, N.Y. TIMES, August 28, 2015, at A11 (questioning whether
language overlap between merits briefs and Justice Thomas’s opinions rises to a level of
“cribbing”).
4. See BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE
SUPREME COURT 34–35 (1979) (discussing the secrecy involved in the interactions
between Supreme Court Justices and clerks in the decisionmaking process).
5. Adam Feldman, A Brief Assessment of Supreme Court Opinion Language, 86 MISS.
L.J. ___ (2017) (forthcoming). An unedited version of this article is available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=2574451.
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6. Surprisingly, even these opinions including large sections of uncited language that
overlaps with the merits briefs are not wholly devoid of citations to the briefs, which I
elaborate on in the conclusion.
7. For instance, some might view overlapping language in the Court’s statements of
facts as inconsequential, but view overlapping language in the Court’s assessment of the
law as more worthy of attribution if unoriginal. Even with cited source material, there is
often strong evidence of the impact of briefs on opinions through the sharing of citations to
less-common references such as treatises and law reviews, as well as sharing of multiple
citations appearing in briefs as parts of string citations.
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almost 10,000 briefs elucidates several patterns in the ways that
merits-brief language makes its way into Supreme Court
opinions. The main foci of this article are cases in which the
briefs have the greatest impact on the Court’s opinions or, put
another way, cases in which the language from a merits brief is
most fundamental to the language of the opinion.6
In many of these instances, the Court uses language from
the briefs as its own without attribution. With these examples,
this article confronts the normative question about when the
Court should note that the opinion language does not originate
with the Justices and their clerks.7
In addition to examining specific brief-opinion
relationships, this article also looks at the factors that tie the set
of cases together. In this sample of cases there are common
threads in terms of the attributes of the cases, Justices, and
litigants. These shared features show that cases with high levels
of language overlap are not entirely random.
The underlying premise of this article is that the language
in Supreme Court opinions matters. The article begins by
looking at why opinion language matters and by developing a
hypothesis for why we might expect the language in briefs to
filter into Supreme Court opinions, sometimes in especially high
doses. After this introduction and a short discussion of how the
article tracks the linguistic similarities between briefs and
opinions, the article compares the cases of interest with their
respective briefs. To conclude, this article examines the
normative implications of this language-sharing practice by
focusing on the ways in which bringing it to light may affect the
perception of the way the Court conducts its business.
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II. WHY FOCUS ON LANGUAGE
The strength of the Supreme Court’s precedents is only as
iron-clad as opinion language permits. Time and again, issues
left unsettled by the Supreme Court lead to new test cases that
percolate back up to the Supreme Court. This can be illustrated
by the Court’s sinuous precedent in Fourth Amendment cases
that define the exclusionary rule.8 As language from past cases
is repeated in subsequent cases, the specific wording of the
opinions affects future decisions of the Supreme Court and
lower courts. Indeed, when interviewed on the subject of
Supreme Court opinions, Justice Scalia underscored the
importance of opinion language:
[T]he only important part about an appellate case is not
who wins or loses; it’s not . . . affirmed or reversed. The
important part is the opinion. And if you affirm or reverse
for the wrong reason, you’ve done everything wrong. . . .
[I]f you haven’t made clear what your holding is, instead of
reducing litigation, instead of making life simpler for courts
9
and lawyers below you, you’ve complicated it.

38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 16 Side B
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8. Although in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court broadly held that
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment should be excluded from
evidence at trial, subsequent cases either chipped away at this holding or added teeth to it.
See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (creating a “good faith” exception to
the exclusionary rule); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (holding that
subject’s identity and body are not suppressible evidence under the exclusionary rule);
Camera v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (holding that housing inspectors need a warrant
to enter and search an apartment building); Schmerber v. Cal., 384 U.S. 757 (1966)
(allowing physical evidence derived from a blood sample taken without the subject’s
consent into evidence at trial). The various trajectories of the exclusionary rule are the
focus of much scholarly debate and analysis. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, The Expressive
Fourth Amendment: Rethinking the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 76
MISS. L.J. 483 (2006) (analyzing the lack of clarity surrounding the good-faith exception to
the exclusionary rule); David A. Moran, The End of the Exclusionary Rule, Among Other
Things: The Roberts Court Takes on the Fourth Amendment, 2005 CATO S. CT. REV. 283
(discussing the ways in which the Court’s 2005 Fourth Amendment cases chip away at the
exclusionary rule); Stephen E. Hessler, Note, Establishing Inevitability Without Active
Pursuit: Defining the Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule, 99 MICH. L. REV. 238 (2000) (examining the lack of clarity
surrounding the reach of the exclusionary rule); James L. Kainen, The Impeachment
Exception to the Exclusionary Rules: Policies, Principles, and Politics, 44 STANFORD L.
REV. 1301 (1992) (looking at use of illegally obtained evidence to impeach a witness at
trial).
9. Bryan A. Garner, Justice Antonin Scalia, 13 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 51, 54
(2010).
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Similarly, Justice Kennedy noted that “the law lives through
language and we must be very careful about the language that
we use.”10 With this understanding, many scholars take seriously
the downstream effects of the Court’s opinion language in
guiding and constraining future decisions in the Supreme Court
and other courts.11
The source of Supreme Court opinion language is relevant
to its institutional standing.12 There is an expectation for the
Court to use language that comes from the machinations of the
Justices based on their understandings of the Constitution as
well as from citations to existing law and secondary sources.13
One of the main sources that provides potential language for
Supreme Court opinions is parties’ merits briefs.14
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10. Bryan A. Garner, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, 13 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 79,
97 (2010).
11. See, e.g., Howard Gillman, The Court as an Idea, Not a Building (or a Game):
Interpretative Institutionalism and the Analysis of Supreme Court Decision-Making, in
SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 65, 80
(Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds. 1999) (“There is evidence that most justices
act in accordance with the Court’s formal responsibility to decide actual legal disputes
based on their best understanding of the law.”); GORDON SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S ALLURE:
HOW LAW SHAPES, CONSTRAINS, SAVES, AND KILLS POLITICS (2009) (noting that the way
in which judges reason through their decisions in prior cases constrains judges’ later
decisions); Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme
Court Decision Making, 96 AM. POLITICAL SCI. REV. 305 (2002) (looking at law’s
influence—in contrast to personal political ideologies’ influence—on Supreme Court
Justices because it operates as a means of establishing specific case factors as relevant or
setting levels of scrutiny); Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course
and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001)
(articulating a theory of the historic course of decisions as a shaper of subsequent
outcomes).
12. See LIEF H. CARTER & THOMAS FREDERICK BURKE, REASON IN LAW (2005)
(utilizing “logic of the triad” framing to explain judicial legitimacy). For background on
the framework of the “logic of the triad” and its application to legal institutions see
generally Martin M. Shapiro, COURTS, A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS
(1981), and Alec Stone Sweet, Judicialization and the Construction of Governance, 32
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES 147 (1999).
13. See Hathaway, supra note 11.
14. Of course, the Court uses lower court opinions, amicus curiae briefs, and original
research in the preparation of its opinions as well. See, e.g., Paul M. Collins, Jr., Pamela C.
Corley & Jesse Hamner, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on U.S. Supreme Court
Opinion Content, 49 L. & SOC’Y REV. 917 (2015); Pamela C. Corley, Paul M. Collins &
Bryan Calvin, Lower Court Influence on U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Content, 73 J.
POLITICS 31 (2011); Todd C. Peppers & Christopher Zorn, Law Clerk Influence on
Supreme Court Decision Making: An Empirical Assessment, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 51
(2008). While I do not exclude the possibility that the merits brief and the opinion both
derived language from one of these common sources, the extent of the relationships
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Briefs organize and synthesize cases for the Justices and
clerks, minimizing their need to turn to other sources.15 They
also distill the information so the Justices and clerks can focus
on other case attributes.16 Chief Justice Rehnquist underscored
this point when he wrote, “The brief writer must . . . bring order
to [the case materials] by organizing—and I cannot stress that
term enough—by organizing, organizing, and organizing, so that
the brief is a coherent presentation of the arguments in favor of
the writer’s client.”17
Given that the Justices’ own statements describe the brief’s
importance in organizing all of the case material for their
digestion, it may not be surprising that there is directly
overlapping language in some cases between the opinion and a
brief. The extent of this relationship, however, varies immensely
and studies have up to this point been generally devoid of such
analysis because qualitative assessments—like the one that I
discuss here—of the language shared between Supreme Court
briefs and opinions are sparse.18

38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 17 Side B
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between individual merits briefs and the Court’s opinions that will be shown below
corroborates the direct influence of the briefs.
15. E. Barrett Prettyman, Some Observations Concerning Appellate Advocacy, 39 VA.
L. REV. 285, 290–91 (1953) (describing utility of briefs for judges).
16. Mark R. Kravitz, Written and Oral Persuasion in the United States Courts: A
District Judge’s Perspective on their History, Function, and Future, 10 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 247, 261–62 (2009) (characterizing the brief as “a superior and more efficient
method of conveying detailed information to a judge,” and noting that “it is always handy
for the judge to have the written submission, and all of its points and authorities, at
hand . . . because the judge need not expend great effort in capturing and storing an
argument to memory,” which allows the judge to “expend more energy on understanding it
and assessing its persuasiveness”).
17. William H. Rehnquist, From Webster to Word-Processing: The Ascendance of the
Appellate Brief, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 4 (1999); see also Richard A. Posner,
Convincing a Federal Court of Appeals, 25 LITIG. 3, 3 (1999) (explaining that an effective
brief is self-contained, so that the judge does not need to consult other sources in order to
understand what is at issue); Albert Tate, The Art of Brief Writing: What a Judge Wants to
Read, 4 LITIG. 11, 13 (1978) (discussing the brief as an organization tool or “judge’s
companion” useful “from before the oral argument until the rehearing is denied”).
18. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 111 (1990)
(explaining that “[j]udges’ opinions do not acknowledge the borrowing of ideas, even
language, from the parties’ briefs, so the evaluation of a judge’s creativity requires
comparison between the opinion and the briefs in each case”); see also LEE EPSTEIN &
JOSEPH FISKE KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE: ABORTION AND
THE DEATH PENALTY 113 (1992) (stating that in the opinion for Gregg v. Ga., 428 U.S.
153 (1976), the Justices “borrowed heavily” from Robert Bork’s amicus brief).
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This article relies on mixed methods, cutting between
quantitative and qualitative ends of the spectrum. As I explain in
the following section, I use quantitative methods to locate the
specific cases and briefs of interest. I then analyze the content of
the shared language to generate inferences surrounding these
relationships in cases with the greatest percentage of shared
language.19
III. MEASURING LANGUAGE OVERLAP
Text-analysis software allows for precise measurements of
shared language. A drawback, however, is that the language
from the two sources must be a near match, and as a
consequence, the software does not pick up on shared meaning
when the words differ.20 I use WCopyfind software for the
analyses on which this article is based.21 This program compares
two documents and reports the similarities in their words, both
in terms of percentage of overlapping language and number of
shared words. The user chooses and inputs certain settings to
calibrate the requirements of language similarity necessary for
the program to note an instance of overlap.
A. Program Settings and Examples

11/10/2016 09:41:10

19. The percentage is based on the amount of shared language relative to the total
opinion, not to the total brief.
20. For example, it would not pick up on the instances in which Justice Cardozo used
briefs’ language as a starting point, but changed the actual words for his opinions. POSNER
supra note 18, at 111–12 (comparing Justice Cardozo’s graceful language in one opinion
with the stilted language in an amicus brief that appears to have been its inspiration, but
noting that Cardozo opinions actually “owe little even those briefs that are excellent”). In
this sense software that measures language similarity is generally under-inclusive of the
actual relationship between the language in briefs and opinions. The software I use—
WCopyfind, see infra note 21 and accompanying text—has a parameter setting for the
percentage of phrases that must match, however, allowing for some flexibility in locating
overlapping language.
21. Lou Bloomfield, Software, WCopyfind, THE PLAGIARISM RESOURCE SITE (n.d.),
http://plagiarism.bloomfieldmedia.com/wordpress/software/wcopyfind.

38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 18 Side A

Understanding the WCopyfind settings is essential to
contextualizing what a high percentage of overlap in a Supreme
Court case means. I use the default settings as others have done
in studies looking at similar relationships of language in legal
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22. See, e.g., Pamela C. Corley, The Supreme Court and Opinion Content: The
Influence of Parties’ Briefs, 61 POLITICAL RESEARCH Q. 468 (2008); see also RYAN C.
BLACK & RYAN J. OWENS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT (2012); Paul M. Collins, Jr., Pamela C. Corley & Jesse Hamner, Me Too? An
Investigation of Repetition in U.S. Supreme Court Amicus Curiae Briefs, 97 JUDICATURE
228 (Mar./Apr. 2014); Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha, Presidential Influence of the News Media:
The Case of the Press Conference, 30 POLITICAL COMM. 548 (2013); Justin Grimmer, A
Bayesian Hierarchical Topic Model for Political Texts: Measuring Expressed Agendas in
Senate Press Releases, 18 POLITICAL ANALYSIS 1 (2010).
23. ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1170 (2014).
24. Id. at 1171.

38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 18 Side B

and political texts.22 The first setting deals with the number of
words in a phrase that must be similar for the program to mark it
as an instance of overlap. I set the minimum phrase length at six
words. This means that phrases under five words will not be
indicated, while phrases of six words or more will be processed.
The second significant setting deals with the percent of language
commonality that phrases must share for the program to
recognize a phrase as relevant. I set this to eighty percent, which
allows for slight differences between phrases in which the
majority of the content is the same. Finally, the program is set to
allow at most two imperfections in the shared language, so it
will not pick up phrases that overlap at eighty percent or more if
there are more than two differences between them.
These settings may be easier to visualize through a
straightforward example. In Lawson v. FMR,23 the program
recorded this sentence in the opinion as overlapping with the
petitioner’s brief: “[The Report concludes]: ‘Congress must
reconsider the incentive system that has been set up that
encourages accountants and lawyers who come across fraud in
their work to remain silent.’” The bracketed words were not
shared with the brief (the brief and the opinion referring to the
same document using different phrasing for its title), but due to
the more than eighty-percent similarity, the program marked the
entire passage as overlapping, and highlighted the words that did
not overlap. Lawson also contains this language: “[the
provisions require] accountants and lawyers for public
companies to investigate and report misconduct, or risk being
banned from further practice before the SEC.”24 The
respondent’s brief has similar—but not exactly the same—
wording: “[u]nder these provisions, a law firm or public
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accounting firm that engages in retaliation against such
whistleblowing can be banned from further practice before the
SEC.”25 The program highlighted only “banned from further
practice before the SEC.” From this result, it is apparent that the
program misses some matches in meaning (in this instance
references to the types of firms banned and the types of actions
that warrant this ban) unless the wording is approximately
identical.
Another important setting is that WCopyfind ignores
punctuation in matching, so that, for instance, the difference of a
comma between phrases will not change the program’s results.
In Lawson, for example, the phrase in the opinion citing the
statutory language of “discriminate against an employee in the
terms and conditions of employment because”26 comes up as an
exact match with the same phrase in the petitioner’s brief,
notwithstanding quotation marks around the phrase in the
petitioner’s version and not in the opinion.27 WCopyfind also
ignores letter case, so a phrase that is the same in both instances
except for an upper-case letter in one would come up as a
complete match.
B. Types of Language Shared Generally

11/10/2016 09:41:10

25. Brief for Respondent at 41, Lawson v. FMR, 2013 WL 5441390 (U.S. Sept. 30,
2013) (No. 12-3).
26. Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1161.
27. See Brief for Petitioner at 8, Lawson v. FMR, 2013 WL 3972434 (U.S. July 31,
2013) (No. 12-3).
28. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
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WCopyfind does not discriminate between types of
overlap, so the matches found in my analysis contain language
that is likely meaningful in the brief-opinion relationship as well
as language that is most likely in the brief and opinion either by
pure chance or because of its importance to the case. As above,
this process may be easier to visualize through a straightforward
example. I use the opinion and the Solicitor General’s (SG’s)
brief from FERC v. Mississippi28 to illustrate the spectrum of
language overlap from presumably inconsequential to likely
meaningful.
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I focus on two main facets in each phrase. First, whether
the language is original or quoted, including whether the opinion
cites to the brief or whether either cites to an extrinsic source.
The second is the type of phrase, focusing on whether it is facts,
argument, a citation from a statute or case, and so on. To
describe the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, Justice
Blackmun writes for the Court that it “was part of a package of
legislation approved the same day, designed to combat the
nationwide energy crisis at the time.”29 The SG’s brief contains
this language: “The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of
1978 . . . was enacted by Congress as part of a package of
legislation designed to combat the nationwide energy crisis.”30
Here, the shared language consists of “part of a package of
legislation designed to combat the nationwide energy crisis.”
This descriptive, factual language is not treated as a quotation in
either place, and so it may be assumed as original in both the
brief and opinion. The shared description makes it clear,
however, that the Court agrees with the SG’s characterization of
the legislation, but does not attribute it to the SG.
FERC contains many instances in which the language is
similar to that used in the SG’s brief, but the opinion does not
mention the SG’s brief as a source. An example of a statement
from the recitation of facts in the opinion that overlaps with the
SG’s brief includes this shared phrasing:31
[E]lectricity utilities were
plagued with increasing costs
and decreasing efficiency in
the use of their generating
capacities; each of these
factors had an adverse effect
on rates to consumers and on
33
the economy as a whole.

11/10/2016 09:41:10

29. Id. at 745.
30. Brief for Appellants at 2, FERC v. Mississippi, 1981 WL 390123 (U.S. Aug. 27,
1981) (No. 80-1749) [hereinafter FERC Brief].
31. In this and all two-column comparisons in this article, the brief is on the left and the
opinion is on the right.
32. FERC Brief, supra note 30, at 2–3.
33. FERC, 456 U.S. at 745–46.
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[E]lectric
utilities
were
plagued with skyrocketing fuel
costs and decreasing efficiency
in the use of their generating
capacity; both of these factors
had an adverse effect on rates
to consumers and on the
32
economy.
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34. Id. at 751 (emphasis added to highlight language not shared between brief and
opinion).
35. Id. at 758 (emphasis added to highlight language not shared between brief and
opinion).
36. FERC Brief, supra note 30, at 24.
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Similar to the phrase previously mentioned, this portion of the
opinion does not cite to the SG’s brief or to an extrinsic source,
yet the language is an almost exact match. Importantly, in this
example the different word choices do not change the meaning
of the text.
Another type of shared language occurs when the brief and
the opinion share a citation. An example in FERC is “[the
statutory section] directs FERC, in consultation with state
regulatory authorities, to promulgate ‘such rules as it determines
necessary to encourage cogeneration and small power
production.’”34 In such instances the shared language provides
evidence of a shared understanding of the importance of the
statutory language. In isolation, one cannot infer that the brief
writer’s choice of language led to the adoption of the same
language in the opinion. Considered cumulatively with other
instances of shared language, though, this overlap underscores
the possibility of, at a minimum, coinciding views between the
brief writer and the opinion writer.
Opinions may also share language with the brief’s
argument. This is perhaps the best evidence of the persuasive
power of the brief, especially when the phrasing is not attributed
to the brief’s author. An example of shared argument language
from the opinion in FERC appears in this sentence: “It is
sufficient that Congress was not irrational in concluding that
limited federal regulation of retail sales of electricity and natural
gas, and of relationships between cogenerators and electric
utilities, was essential.”35 In the brief the word “sufficient” is
replaced with “clear enough”36 which does little to alter the
meaning of the phrase, providing the Court with some
background for treating the “clear enough” evidence of
Congressional intent as legally “sufficient.” The opinion uses
this sentence to support its subsequent declaration that this “is
enough to place the challenged portions of PURPA within
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Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause.”37 While it does
not provide conclusive evidence that the wording in the brief led
to the phrasing in the opinion, this overlap, along with other
phrases in the opinion that articulate viewpoints congruent with
the SG’s position, lends support to the proposition that the
Justices (or their clerks38) read and analyzed the brief and found
it persuasive, and it potentially also indicates that they adopted
the brief’s language for the opinion itself.
C. Exploring the Cases

11/10/2016 09:41:10

37. FERC, 456 U.S. at 751.
38. See generally David J. Garrow, The Lowest Form of Animal Life? 84 CORNELL L.
REV. 855 (1999) (reviewing books that look at clerks’ lead roles in drafting opinions).
39. I use Washington University’s well-known Supreme Court Database. Spaeth et. al.,
Supreme Court Database, WASH. UNIV. L. (2014), http://www.supremecourtdatabase.org.
40. This article does not delve into causal mechanisms. The factors linking cases
merely show correlations that may help generate a deeper causal understanding of the role
that briefs play in influencing opinion language.
41. For empirical results supporting this correlate, see Feldman, supra note 5. For
empirical support of the SG’s success before the Supreme Court from multiple dimensions
including shared language with the Court’s opinions, see generally Black and Owens,
supra note 22, and see Corley, supra note 22, at 476 (showing that the Court shared more
language with the Solicitor General’s briefs than with those of other experienced members
of the Supreme Court bar for the 2002–2004 terms).

38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 20 Side B

Some shared features of the cases in this study, which
covers the 1946 through 2013 Supreme Court Terms,39 are
worthy of note. These similarities provide insight into the factors
or mechanisms that play a role in extremely high levels of
language overlap between opinions and merits briefs.40 Previous
works show that the Court tends to share more or less language
with briefs based on specific factors such as the presence of the
SG as counsel of record.41
Along with the percentage of overlapping language for
each case, I also aggregated the number of overlapping words in
each brief-opinion pair. Upon analysis I found one subset of
cases in which there is an especially high probability that merits
briefs will strongly impact Supreme Court opinion content.
Table 1 presents the typical impact of merits briefs on
opinions, which depends on the combination of the percentage
of the opinion that shares language with the brief and the
number of words in the opinion that overlap with words from
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the brief. (Both calculations are from the same overlapping
language.) The distinction between these subsets is based on an
extensive qualitative analysis of the brief-opinion relationships
in the dataset. In certain cases, as will become evident below,
the relationship between brief and opinion will not neatly fit into
the relationship type described in the typology. The typology is
not meant to encompass every brief-opinion relationship, but
rather to work as a heuristic to approximately group these
linguistic relationships.42 The thresholds for overlapping words
and percentages are guidelines that lead to a reasonable
separation of groups, and most importantly, they separate out the
highest-impact group: the Lifted relationship.43
Later in the article I present examples from all four types of
relationships, but the Lifted group presents some of the strongest
examples indicating that specific briefs made meaningful
contributions to the language in the opinions and that the
opinions used substantive language from the briefs. To bracket
the cases, I set a threshold of thirty-three percent overlap
between opinion and brief as the demarcation between high and
low percentage overlap and 1,000 shared words as the
demarcation between high and low word overlap.

High

Low
Shared Understanding
Shared language generally
interspersed throughout opinion;
includes facts, law, secondary
authority—often with significant
impact on opinion

Low

High
Lifted Language
Greatest impact throughout
opinion; brief used as template;
shared legal reasoning and
salient language; brief clear
source
Common Source
Generally shared source
described in lower-court record
is shared source

Traditional Impact
From marginal to interspersed law
and facts—most common form

11/10/2016 09:41:10

42. See e.g. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 99 n.9 (1974) (referring, in the course of
creating a typology to estimate and explain the advantage of “repeat players” in litigation,
to SG’s establishment of trusting relationship at Supreme Court).
43. I used a multi-methods approach to help locate these cases. See NICHOLAS WELLER
& JEB BARNES, FINDING PATHWAYS: MIXED-METHOD RESEARCH FOR STUDYING
CAUSAL MECHANISMS (2014).
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Typology of Impact of Brief on Opinion Language
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44. This is underscored by the fact that the length of opinions has generally grown in
recent years. See, e.g., Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs, An Empirical Analysis of the
Length of U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 621 (2008).
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There are twenty-two Lifted opinions in the dataset.
Although there are a few exceptions, most use language from
merits briefs as templates for the wording in the opinions. This
often includes the Court’s adopting the argument from the brief.
In Lifted opinions in particular the percentage overlap and
overlapping word metrics do not provide the entire picture. As
the examples below show, instances of language overlap in these
cases also point to sections in the opinion that almost assuredly
derive from language in the brief, but due to the software’s
capabilities and limitations, do not come up as overlapping
matches.
The last case that fits the Lifted criteria is from 1993. This
implies that the relationship between specific merits briefs and
the Court’s opinions has evolved away from Lifted opinions in
the last several decades.44 That last Lifted opinion—from
1993—was, like the majority of Lifted opinions, authored by
Justice Blackmun. As I show below, Justice Blackmun was the
majority opinion writer for twelve of the twenty-two Lifted
opinions, and each of these Blackmun opinions shares a
substantial amount of language with a brief from the SG.
Finally, there is a strong distinction in the cases between
the amount of language each Lifted opinion shares with the nonhighly similar merits brief and the amount each shares with the
highly similar merits brief. This is evident from the fact that no
Lifted opinion shares the threshold number of words and
percentage overlap with both merits briefs filed in that case. The
high level of difference between the amounts of language the
opinions share with one merits brief relative to the other is
telling in that it is not merely uncontested statements and
quotations that form the basis of the shared language. Although
it is beyond the scope of this article to dissect the psychology of
the Justices in an attempt to uncover whether the briefs cause the
Justices to utilize the same language, or if the Justices simply
share the opinions of the brief writer, the examples of
relationships predicated on lifted language show the extent of
the role briefs can play in opinion construction.
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First I examine Common Source, Shared Understanding,
and Traditional Impact brief-to-opinion relationships. Then I
juxtapose these with the relationship of most interest: the Lifted
brief-to-opinion relationship.
D. Common Source Relationships
(High Percentage Overlap, Low Word Overlap)

11/10/2016 09:41:10

45. 384 U.S. 195 (1966).
46. This is a Common Source opinion because, although the percentage overlap is high,
the number of overlapping words is below the 1,000 word threshold. See Table 1, supra
page 33, and accompanying text.
47. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
48. Ashton, 384 U.S. at 199 (quoting Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 308); Brief for Petitioner at
24, Ashton v. Kentucky, 1966 WL 115462 (U.S. Mar 14, 1966) (No. 619) (same)
[hereinafter Ashton Brief].
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The case in the dataset with the highest percentage overlap
between a brief and opinion is Ashton v. Kentucky,45 an opinion
for the Court authored by Justice Douglas that shares fifty-nine
percent of its language and 850 of its 1430 words with the brief
for the petitioner.46 The opinion in this case is typical of the
Common Source type, as the overlapping language is primarily
based on shared citations. At one point in this opinion, for
example, 434 continuously shared words—more than fifty
percent of the shared language—derive from the pamphlet that
led to the libel claim at the heart of the case, which is lengthily
quoted in both brief and opinion.
Aside from this long shared citation, the Court and the
petitioner’s brief also rely on many of the same cases. The Court
analogizes to Cantwell v. Connecticut,47 in which interpretation
of a related statute was required. The Ashton opinion and the
petitioner’s brief both note that the Cantwell Court stated that
“[the] offense known as breach of the peace embraces a great
variety of conduct destroying or menacing public order and
tranquility. It includes not only violent acts but acts and words
likely to produce violence in others.”48 Both quote Cantwell for
what was problematic in the law: “Here we have a situation
analogous to a conviction under a statute sweeping in a great
variety of conduct under a general and indefinite
characterization, and leaving to the executive and judicial

38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 22 Side B

11/10/2016 09:41:10

FELDMANRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE)

36

11/7/2016 12:38 PM

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

branches too wide a discretion.”49 Comparisons in such cases
may suggest that a party thought along the same lines as the
Justices and clerks, although it sheds little light on whether the
brief made a significant impact on the opinion writer or writers.
Common Source opinions can mirror Lifted opinions more
closely, although they generally do not display the same overall
similitude between brief and opinion as found in Lifted
instances. An example of this sort of relationship can be found
in Bulova Watch Company v. United States.50 Justice
Whittaker’s opinion for the Court in Bulova shares forty-eight
percent of its language (861 words) with the SG’s brief. The
brief in this instance was written by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) under the direction of SG Archibald Cox, and
the SG’s presence is often an indicator that the Court will rely
on the brief’s language, especially when the views expressed in
it accord with the Justices’ positions on the issues. The Bulova
opinion relies on the SG’s brief for its depiction of the
petitioner’s argument:
Petitioner further contends that
§2411(a) is a later enactment than
§3771(e) and, for that reason,
should take precedence over it.
We do not believe that §2411(a)
can fairly be regarded as a later
enactment than § 3771(e), for at
the time § 3771(e) was enacted,
in 1942, a predecessor provision
of § 2411(a) had long been on the
books. Save for the word
“hereby”—of
no
possible
significance—that
predecessor
provision (§177(b) of the Judicial
Code, 28 U.S.C. (1940 ed.)
§284(b) was identical with the
present §2411(a). But even if
petitioner were correct in

11/10/2016 09:41:10

49. Ashton, 384 at 199 (quoting Cantwell); Ashton Brief, supra note 48, at 24 (same).
As this analogy is not in the State’s favor, it does not appear in Kentucky’s brief.
50. 365 U.S. 753 (1961).
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Even if petitioner were correct in
stating that Section 2411(a) is to
be regarded as the later
enactment, it would not follow
that it would take precedence, for
it has been frequently held that a
specific statute over-rides a
general statute “without regard to
priority of enactment.” Townsend
v. Little, 109 U.S. 504, 512. More
than that, however, the premise of
the argument is erroneous. At the
time Section 3771(e) was enacted
(in 1942), a predecessor provision
of Section 2411(a) had long been
on the books. Save for one word
of no possible significance, this
predecessor provision (Section

38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 23 Side A

11/10/2016 09:41:10

FELDMANRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE)

11/7/2016 12:38 PM

BORROWED LANGUAGE IN SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

177(b) of the Judicial Code, 28
U.S.C., 1940 ed., Section 284(b))
was identical in terms with the
51
present Section 2411(a).
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concluding that § 2411(a) is to be
regarded as the later enactment, it
would not necessarily take
precedence over § 3711(e), for it
is familiar law that a specific
statute controls over a general one
“without regard to priority of
enactment.” Townsend v. Little,
52
109 U.S. 504, 512.

In the above example, the Court uses the same reasoning as the
SG to explain both why the petitioner was incorrect in that
instance as well as why § 2411(a) is not necessarily a later
enactment than § 3771(e).
Elsewhere, the opinion shares language with the SG’s brief
in interpreting the Congressional intent behind § 3771(e). Both
rely on the same report from the Senate Finance Committee:
From this statement, it is apparent
that Congress proposed (1) to
deny interest up to the date that a
carry-back could be determined
and (2) to prevent, through delay
in the presentation of claims, the
accumulation of interest after that
53
date.

There are several other instances of extensive language
sharing between the SG’s brief and the Court’s opinion in
Bulova, mainly dealing with the interpretation of relevant
precedent. With its instances of shared substantive language
between brief and opinion, Bulova presents an example of how
Common Source opinions may share Lifted opinion
characteristics on a smaller scale.

11/10/2016 09:41:10

51. Brief for the United States at 10, Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 1961 WL
101948 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1961) (No. 241) [hereinafter Bulova Brief].
52. Bulova, 365 U.S. at 758.
53. Bulova Brief, supra note 51, at 16.
54. Bulova, 365 U.S. at 760.
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This surely shows Congress’
purpose to deny interest on carryback refunds for any period prior
to the time they could be
determined, and also to prevent,
through delay in the presentation
of claims, the accumulation of
interest after that date and prior to
54
the filing of the claim.
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E. Shared Understanding (Low Percentage Overlap, High
Words Overlap) and Traditional Impact (Low Percentage
Overlap, Low Words Overlap) Examples
Shared Understanding opinions are more frequent of late,
as lengthier opinions allow for relationships in which the overall
number of shared words is on the higher end of the spectrum,
although nowhere near the thirty-three percent overlappinglanguage threshold. Four have the highest level of word overlap
during the early Roberts period, and two are on the high end of
percentage language overlap as well. The first is Graham v.
Florida,55 in which Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the
Court analyzing the constitutionality of imposing a life sentence
on a juvenile. Twelve percent of the opinion—1,327 words—
overlaps with the petitioner’s brief. But the shared language,
often salient to the Court’s analysis, does not originate with the
petitioner’s brief. It comes from common sources:
As compared to adults, juveniles
have a ‘‘‘lack of maturity and an
underdeveloped
sense
of
responsibility’”; they “are more
vulnerable or susceptible to
negative influences and outside
pressures,
including
peer
pressure”; and their characters are
57
“not as well formed.”

In fact, even expert psychologists
cannot reliably “differentiate
between the juvenile offender
whose crime reflects unfortunate
yet transient immaturity, and the
rare juvenile offender whose

These salient characteristics mean
that “[i]t is difficult even for expert
psychologists to differentiate
between the juvenile offender
whose crime reflects unfortunate
yet transient immaturity, and the

11/10/2016 09:41:10

55. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
56. Brief for Petitioner at 26, Graham v. Florida, 2009 WL 2159655 (U.S. July 16,
2009) (No. 08-7412) (discussing conclusions reached in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005)) [hereinafter Graham Brief].
57. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (same).
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First, juveniles possess less
maturity and an underdeveloped
sense of responsibility, which
often results in impetuous and illconsidered actions and decisions.
Second, juveniles are more
vulnerable and susceptible to
negative influences and outside
pressures,
including
peer
56
pressure.
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crime
reflects
irreparable rare juvenile offender whose
58
corruption.” Id. at 573.
crime
reflects
irreparable
59
corruption.” Id., at 573.

Thus, the shared language in Graham is integral to the
Court’s decision. It supports the notion that the imposition of a
life sentence violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment, which was the Court’s ultimate
conclusion. Still, the overlapping language primarily stems from
a common source, so it cannot be determined if Justice Kennedy
and his clerks utilized the language due to the brief’s persuasive
powers or due to a common acknowledgement of the importance
of the wording from the precedent that they both cited.
Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court in
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,60 shares twelve percent of
its language—1,359 words—with the SG’s brief. As in Graham,
however, there are several instances of meaningful shared
language from shared sources, all of which relate in this case to
whether a federal statute is unconstitutionally vague. Examples
of such shared language include:
“But ‘perfect clarity and precise
guidance have never been
required even of regulations that
restrict expressive activity.’”
Williams, supra, at 304, . . .
(quoting Ward v. Rock Against
62
Racism, 491 U.S. 781 . . . (1989)).

The statute does not prohibit “The statute does not prohibit
advocacy
or
independent
advocacy
or independent
63
expression of any kind.”64
expression of any kind.

11/10/2016 09:41:10

58. Graham Brief, supra note 56, at 49.
59. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68.
60. 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
61. Brief for Respondents at 18, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 2009 WL
4951303 (U.S. Dec. 22, 2009) (No. 08-1498) [hereinafter Humanitarian Law Brief].
62. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 19.
63. Humanitarian Law Brief, supra note 61, at 13.
64. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 26 (citing “Brief for Government” as
source).
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This Court has repeatedly
observed that “perfect clarity and
precise guidance have never been
required even of regulations that
restrict expressive activity.” Ward
v. Rock Against Racism, 491
61
U.S. 781, 794 (1989).
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In both Graham and Humanitarian Law Project, there is no
question of the source of the language. Even with the same
propositions supporting the arguments in the opinions and the
briefs, there is attribution to the proper sources. But the role of
the briefs in fashioning the language for the opinions is not
entirely clear outside of the instances in which the opinions cite
the briefs.
Next is Pepper v. United States,65 in which Justice
Sotomayor’s opinion for the Court deals with resentencing. With
1,784 overlapping words and twenty-two percent overlap
between the opinion and the respondent’s brief, this case ranks
high on the list of overall word overlap. As is typical for Shared
Understanding cases, the shared language in this case primarily
revolves around shared citations to precedent. Even with the
high level of overlapping words in Pepper, the overlapping
language is dispersed about the opinion and the sections of
overlapping language are not as dense as is typical in Lifted
scenarios. Some examples of shared language in Pepper
meaningful to the Court’s conclusion include:
“It has been uniform and constant
in the federal judicial tradition for
the sentencing judge to consider
every convicted person as an
individual and every case as a
unique study in the human
failings that sometimes mitigate,
sometimes magnify, the crime
and the punishment to ensue.”
Koon v. United States, 518 U.S.
67
81, 113.

Section 3577 permitted a Both
Congress
and
sentencing judge in determining Sentencing Commission
the appropriate punishment to expressly
preserved

the
thus
the

11/10/2016 09:41:10

65. 562 U.S. 476 (2011).
66. Brief for the United States at 30, Pepper v. United States, 2010 WL 3426283 (U.S.
Aug. 31, 2010) (No. 09-6822) (citing Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996))
[hereinafter Pepper Brief].
67. Pepper, 562 U.S. at 487.
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It has been a “uniform and
constant” principle of the federal
sentencing tradition that the
sentencing court will “consider
every convicted person as an
individual and every case as a
unique study in the human
failings that sometimes mitigate,
sometimes magnify, the crime
66
and the punishment to ensue.”
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“conduct an inquiry broad in
scope, largely unlimited either as
to the kind of information he may
consider, or the source from
which it may come.” United
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443,
68
446 (1972).

41

traditional
discretion
of
sentencing courts to “conduct an
inquiry broad in scope, largely
unlimited either as to the kind of
information [they] may consider,
or the source from which it may
come.” United States v. Tucker,
69
404 U.S. 443, 446.

One recent Shared Understanding case shows how the
delineation between the relationships in these cases and Lifted
relationships is not always clear. Justice Thomas’s opinion for
the Court in Marx v. General Revenue Corporation70 includes
1198 overlapping words, or a twenty-five percent overall
overlap between the opinion and the respondent’s brief.
Although the majority of the shared language tracks typical
Shared Understanding examples, two instances of shared
language in Marx are quite similar to the type of overlap
typically particular to Lifted opinions.
In the first example from Marx, the opinion shares
language from the respondent’s brief to strengthen a legal
argument:
If Congress had excluded “and
costs” in the second sentence,
plaintiffs might have argued that
the expression of costs in the first
sentence and the exclusion of
costs in the second meant that
defendants could only recover
attorney’s fees when plaintiffs
72
bring an action in bad faith.
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68. Pepper Brief, supra note 66, at 32.
69. Pepper, 562 U.S. at 489.
70. ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1166 (2013).
71. Brief for Respondent at 15–16, Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 2012 WL 3945843
(U.S. Sept. 10, 2012) (No. 11-1175) [hereinafter Marx Brief].
72. Marx, 133 S. Ct. at 1176.
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By adding “and costs” to the
second
sentence,
Congress
foreclosed the argument that,
under expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, the expression of costs in
the first sentence and exclusion of
the same term in the second
meant that defendants could
recover only attorney’s fees, and
71
not costs.
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In this instance the opinion and brief use the same tools of
statutory interpretation to gain leverage on Congressional intent
for recovering costs and attorney fees. The matching language
likely presents a situation in which the argument from the brief
was used as a template for the analysis in the opinion, something
that is prevalent in Lifted opinions. Comparing the brief and the
opinion suggests the brief as the likely source of the language in
the opinion.
The next example from Marx is something atypical in nonLifted cases: an extensive passage for which a brief was almost
assuredly used as a basis for the language in the opinion. Not
only is there considerable overlapping language throughout the
passage, but even the non-overlapping language expresses the
same points in the same sequence:

11/10/2016 09:41:10

Second, redundancy is “hardly
unusual” in statutes addressing
costs. See id., at. . . . 131 S. Ct.
2238, 180 L. Ed. 2d 131.
Numerous statutes overlap with
Rule 54(d)(1). See, e.g., 12 U.S.C
§2607(d)(5) (“[T]he court may
award to the prevailing party the
court costs of the action”);
§5565(b) (2006 ed., Supp. V)
(“the
[Consumer
Financial
Protection]Bureau . . . may
recover its costs in connection
with prosecuting such action if
[it] . . . is the prevailing party in
the action”); 15 U.S.C §6104(d)
(2006 ed.) (“The court . . . may
award costs of suit and reasonable
fees for attorneys and expert
witnesses to the prevailing
party”); §7706(f)(4) (“In the case
of any successful action . . . the
court, in its discretion, may award
the costs of the action”);
§7805(b)(3) (“[T]he court may
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The canon against superfluity
should particularly give way
when “excess language” is
“hardly unusual.” Microsoft, 131
S. Ct. at 2249. A myriad of
statutes overlap with Rule 54(d).
E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 2607(d)(5) (Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act
of 1974) (“the court may award to
the prevailing party the court
costs of the action”); 12 U.S.C. §
5565(b) (Consumer Financial
Protection Act of 2010) (“the
[Consumer Financial Protection]
Bureau . . . may recover its costs
in connection with prosecuting
such action if [it] is the prevailing
party in the action”); 15 U.S.C. §
6104(d) (Telemarketing and
Consumer Fraud and Abuse
Prevention Act) (“[t]he court . . .
may award costs of suit and
reasonable fees for attorneys and
expert witnesses to the prevailing
party”); 15 U.S.C. § 7706(f)(4)
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73. Marx Brief, supra note 71, at 24–25.
74. Marx, 133 S. Ct. at 1177–78.

award to the prevailing party
costs”); §8131(2) (2006 ed.,
Supp. V) (“The court may also, in
its discretion, award costs and
attorneys’ fees to the prevailing
party”); 29 U.S.C §431(c) (2006
ed.) (“The court . . . may, in its
discretion . . . allow a reasonable
attorney’s fee to be paid by the
defendant, and costs of the
action”); 42 U.S.C §3612(p)
(“[T]he court . . . in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party ...
a reasonable attorney's fee and
costs”); § 3613(c)(2) (“[T]he
court, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party . . . a
reasonable attorney's fee and
costs”); 47 U.S.C. § 551(f)(2)
(“[T]he court may award . . .
other litigation costs reasonably
incurred”). . . . a reasonable
attorney’s fee and costs”);
§3613(c)(2) (“[T]he court, in its
discretion, may allow the
prevailing party . . . a reasonable
attorney’s fee and costs”); 47
U.S.C §551(f)(2) (“[T]he court
may award . . . other litigation
74
costs reasonably incurred”).
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(Controlling the Assault of NonSolicited
Pornography
and
Marketing Act) (“[i]n the case of
any successful action . . . the
court, in its discretion, may award
the costs of the action”); 15
U.S.C. § 7805(b)(3) (Sports
Agent Responsibility and Trust
Act) (“the court may award to the
prevailing party costs”); 15 U.S.C.
§ 8131(2) (Anti-Cybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act) (“[t]he
court may also, in its discretion,
award costs and attorneys’ fees to
the prevailing party”); 29 U.S.C.
§ 431(c) (Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act)
(“[t]he court . . . may, in its
discretion . . . allow a reasonable
attorney’s fee to be paid by the
defendant, and costs of the
action”); 42 U.S.C. § 3612(p)
(Fair Housing Act) (“the court . . .
in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party . . . a reasonable
attorney’s fee and costs”); 42
U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (Fair Housing
Act) (“the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party
. . . a reasonable attorney’s fee
and costs”); 47 U.S.C. § 551(f)(2)
(Communications Act) (“[t]he
court may award . . . other
litigation
costs
reasonably
73
incurred”).
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Marx thus presents an instance in which the brief provided a
template for the Court opinion. The opinion tracks the brief’s
lengthy phrases in meaning and uses the same references. Much
of the overlap is through shared citations, but the similarity
between passages makes it unlikely that the brief’s wording did
not play a large role in shaping the language in the opinion.
Traditional Impact opinions, the most common in the
dataset, can look like Shared Understanding opinions, but with
less shared language. Although they also may occasionally share
characteristics of Lifted opinions, the shared language tends to
be sparse, so it is more difficult to decipher the extent of the
impact (if any) that the brief made on the opinion’s content.
Scrutiny of Kloeckner v. Solis,75 for example, shows that the
brief in that case affected the opinion’s content here:
Section 7702(a)(3) defines for the
most part which MSPB decisions
qualify as “judicially reviewable
action[s],” providing that “[a]ny
decision of the Board under
paragraph (1) of this subsection
shall be a judicially reviewable
action as of” the date of the
76
decision.”

That provision, the Government
states, “defines for the most part
which MSPB decisions qualify as
‘judicially reviewable actions[s]’”
by “providing that ‘[a]ny decision
of the Board under paragraph (1)
of this subsection shall be a
judicially reviewable action as of’
77
the date of the decision.”

And here:
That
provision,
as
the
Government notes, is designed
“to save employees from being
held in perpetual uncertainty by
79
Board inaction.”

11/10/2016 09:41:10

75. ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 596 (2012).
76. Brief for Respondent at 21, Kloeckner v. Solis, 2012 WL 2883261 (U. S. July 13,
2012) (No. 11-184) [hereinafter Kloeckner Brief].
77. Kloeckner, 133 S. Ct. at 605 (citing Kloeckner Brief).
78. Kloeckner Brief, supra note 76, at 28.
79. Kloeckner, 133 S. Ct. at 606 (citing Kloeckner Brief).
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The purpose of the provision is to
save employees from being held
in perpetual uncertainty by Board
78
inaction.

38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 27 Side A

11/10/2016 09:41:10

FELDMANRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE)

11/7/2016 12:38 PM

BORROWED LANGUAGE IN SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

45

In the more recent cases, we tend to see the largest impact
of a brief when it is cited in the opinion. Although shared
citations to precedent are common, instances of shared language
similar to the lengthy passage in Marx80 are not due to the lower
percentage of overlapping language and fewer overlapping
words in relationships of Traditional Impact like those found in
Kloeckner. In Kloeckner, as in many other cases from the last
several decades, opinions tend to attribute unoriginal language
to a source internal or external to the case itself. With Lifted
opinions, such attribution typically is not present.
F. Lifted Relationships
(High Percentage Overlap and High Word Overlap)

11/10/2016 09:41:10

80. See supra text accompanying notes 73 and 74.
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The briefs in Lifted relationships play a greater role than
merely persuading Justices to vote a certain way. These are
cases in which the briefs ultimately affect the Court’s assertions,
its assessments of the facts, and the outcome of the law to be
applied in future cases. Table 2 below breaks each opinion down
into its composite sections dealing with facts and law, and
measures the percentage of opinion language from each section
that overlaps with the relevant merits brief. This dichotomy
points to opinions in which the briefs impact the recitation of
facts versus those for which the briefs are an aid in the
construction of law and in the Court’s legal reasoning.
It should not be surprising that one of the most trusted
litigants before the Court, the SG, was the author of all but two
of the briefs in cases with Lifted opinions. The examples below
that include the SG’s brief not only show high levels of
similarity due to shared citations, but also due to large quantities
of text shared between the briefs and opinions, and yet the
opinions lack any form of attribution to the briefs.
The chronological chain of Supreme Court decisionmaking
strengthens the probability that the briefs played a decisive role
in the opinion language. The briefs predate the opinions and are
circulated among the Justices. The Justices and clerks gain
valuable information about the case through the briefs. As the
cases show, the voice and rhetorical devices in the opinion
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language are sufficiently similar to those in the briefs to suggest
a decisive role for the briefs. It is difficult to conceive of another
source that could provide both the opinion writer and the brief
writer with the same material at this frequency. The
constructions of the facts and arguments in these opinions share
the tone of the briefs, with the highly overlapping language
leading the opinions to echo arguments made by the brief
writers. This goes beyond the neutral language we might expect
to find from a shared source and is often instead pointed
language that parallels the arguments made in the briefs. There
tends to be little in the way of attribution in these opinions to
any source, although the similarity between the language in the
briefs and opinions makes it nearly impossible to conclude that
the language in the opinions did not derive from the briefs.
As Table 2 (which appears on the next page) shows, there
is generally a large portion of both facts and law shared between
the opinions and briefs. The briefs in these cases impact the
Court’s reasoning as do the recitations of facts likely derived
from the case records. Only two cases fall below twenty percent
overlap in the area of the opinions’ legal reasoning, suggesting
that the Court typically tends to rely on the briefs’ presentations
of both law and facts.81

38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 27 Side B
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81. Because a detailed examination of each case in this list would require hundreds of
pages, I attempt in the following discussion to distill the most salient and relevant shared
passages between the briefs and opinions. And because the extent of the similarity between
Lifted opinions and briefs is helpful in understanding the impact of the briefs on the
opinions, and appreciating how in many instances the briefs are templates for many parts of
the opinions, I provide an online appendix that includes each opinion in full, highlighted to
show the language shared with the lifted brief. See Adam Feldman, All Copying Is Not
Created Equal: Appendix (2016), https://sites.google.com/a/usc.edu/afresearch/home/papers
/allcopyingappendix.
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Table 2
Impact of Brief on Opinion Language
Justice

Term

Case

Party

Facts/Law

Words

Total

Warren
Goldberg
Warren
Marshall
Blackmun
Blackmun
Blackmun
Marshall
Stewart
Stewart
White
Blackmun
Blackmun
Burger
Blackmun
Blackmun
Powell
Blackmun
Blackmun
Blackmun
Blackmun
Blackmun

1955
1963
1963
1975
1977
1979
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1982
1983
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1989
1989
1992
1993

Steiner (SG brief)
Tilton (SG brief)
Foti (SG brief)
Train (SG brief)
MacDonald (SG brief)
Lewis (SG brief)
DiFrancesco (SG brief)
Hodel (SG brief)
Lehman (SG brief)
Carter
Valencia
New Banner (SG brief)
Russello (SG brief)
89 Firearms (SG brief)
Nat’l Bank (SG brief)
Hughes (SG brief)
Yuckert (SG brief)
Egan (SG brief)
Doe Agency (SG brief)
U. Penn (SG brief)
Keystone (SG brief)
Posters N’ Things (SG brief)

Resp
Pet
Resp
Pet
Pet
Resp
Pet
Pet
Pet
Pet
Pet
Pet
Resp
Pet
Pet
Pet
Pet
Pet
Pet
Resp
Pet
Resp

71/14%
43/44%
43/30%
29/33%
30/46%
35/38%
41/28%
56/37%
22/50%
48/32%
50/30%
55/38%
33/55%
28/38%
43/51%
37/28%
39/49%
60/47%
44/38%
53/25%
39/37%
54/38%

1,015
1,187
1,119
1,466
1,395
1,036
1,921
1,675
1,141
1,427
1,153
1,975
1821
1,178
2,216
1,108
1,446
1,955
1,097
1,555
1,010
1,178

53%
44%
34%
32%
42%
40%
33%
43%
43%
41%
35%
43%
51%
38%
50%
33%
43%
52%
42%
33%
39%
41%

1. Blackmun Cases

11/10/2016 09:41:10

Justice Blackmun, more than any other member of the
Court, showed a high level of willingness to engage the SG’s
arguments and to parallel the SG’s reasoning and language
throughout his opinions for the Court. This relationship is
underscored by its continuity throughout his career on the Court.
While no other justice authored more than two Lifted opinions
during the period covered by the dataset, Justice Blackmun
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Often even the non-overlapping language in the opinions is
so closely related to the language in the briefs that it would be
difficult to make a compelling argument that the author of the
opinion did not lift the language and argument from the brief,
simply exchanging a few words for their synonyms in the
process.
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authored twelve from 1977 through 1993. Due to the high
percentage of Lifted opinions Justice Blackmun authored, I
discuss his Lifted opinions first, and then those authored by
other Justices.
The first Lifted opinion authored by Justice Blackmun for
the Court is United States v. MacDonald.82 As Table 2 shows,
almost fifty percent of the opinion’s discussion of the law
overlaps with the brief filed in that case by the SG. The opinion
clearly follows the brief for the assessment of the applicable
caselaw, as can be seen here:
This Court has twice departed in
criminal cases from the general
prohibition against piecemeal
appellate review, invoking on
both occasions the so-called
“collateral order” exception to the
final
judgment
rule,
first
announced in Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
83
541, 545–547.

This Court in criminal cases has
twice departed from the general
prohibition against piecemeal
appellate review. Abney v. United
States, supra; Stack v. Boyle, 342
U.S. 1, 72 S. Ct. 1, 96 L. Ed. 3
(1951). In each instance, the
Court relied on the finaljudgment rule’s “collateral order”
exception articulated in Cohen v.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541, 545–547, 69 S. Ct.
1221, 1225–1226, 93 L. Ed. 1528
84
(1949).

Like the denial of a motion to
dismiss an indictment on double
jeopardy grounds, a pretrial order
rejecting a defendant’s speedy
trial claim plainly “lacks the
finality traditionally considered
indispensable to appellate review”
(Abney v. United States, supra,

Like the denial of a motion to
dismiss an indictment on double
jeopardy grounds, a pretrial order
rejecting a defendant’s speedy
trial claim plainly “lacks the
finality traditionally considered
indispensable
to
appellate
review,” Abney v. United States,

11/10/2016 09:41:10

82. 435 U.S. 850 (1978).
83. Brief for the United States at *27, United States v. MacDonald, 1977 WL 189842
(U.S. Sept. 7, 1977) (No. 75-1892) [hereinafter MacDonald Brief].
84. MacDonald, 435 U.S. at 854.
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slip op. 7). Hence, if such orders
may be appealed prior to trial, it
must be because they satisfy the
restrictive qualifications identified
in Cohen and Abney as sufficient
to justify dispensing with the
normal rules against piecemeal
review before final judgment. . . .
[T]he same cannot be said of the
denial of a pretrial motion to
dismiss an indictment on speedy
trial grounds.85

49

431 U.S., at 659, 97 S. Ct., at
2040, that is, such an order
obviously is not final in the sense
of terminating the criminal
proceedings in the trial court.
Thus, if such an order may be
appealed before trial, it is because
it satisfies the criteria identified
in Cohen and Abney as sufficient
to warrant suspension of the
established
rules
against
piecemeal review before final
judgment. . . . We believe it clear
that an order denying a motion to
dismiss an indictment on speedy
trial grounds does not satisfy
86
those criteria.

And here:

MacDonald Brief, supra note 83, at *30–*31.
MacDonald, 435 U.S. at 857.
MacDonald Brief, supra note 83, at *23–*24.
MacDonald, 435 U.S. at 857.

11/10/2016 09:41:10

85.
86.
87.
88.

In keeping with what appear to be
the only two other federal cases
in which a defendant has sought
pretrial review of an order
denying his motion to dismiss an
indictment on speedy trial
grounds, we hold that the Court
of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to
entertain respondent’s speedy
trial appeal. United States v.
Bailey, 512 F.2d 833 (CA5), cert.
dism’d, 423 U.S. 1039, 96 S. Ct.
578, 46 L.Ed.2d 415 (1975); Kyle
v. United States, 211 F.2d 912
88
(CA9 1954).
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We are aware of only two other
federal cases in which a
defendant has sought pretrial
appellate review of an order
denying his motion to dismiss the
indictment because of an alleged
violation of the Sixth Amendment
right to a speedy trial, and in both
instances the court of appeals
held that it lacked jurisdiction to
consider the claim prior to
conviction. See United States v.
Bailey, 512 F. 2d 833 (C.A. 5),
certiorari dismissed, 423 U.S.
1039; Kyle v. United States, 211
87
F. 2d 912 (C.A. 9).
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The opinion’s conclusion also parallels the petitioner’s
brief:
[T]he
important
policy
considerations that underlie
both the Speedy Trial Clause
and the statutory bar to
piecemeal appeals in criminal
cases strongly suggest that
speedy trial motions are the
least appropriate subject for
interlocutory appellatereview.
.....

Significantly, this Court has
emphasized that one of the
principal reasons for its strict
adherence to the doctrine of
finality in criminal cases is that
“[t]he
Sixth
Amendment
guarantees a speedy trial.” Di
Bella v. United States, 369 U.S.,
at 126, 82 S. Ct., at 658.
Fulfillment of this guarantee
would be impossible if every
90
pretrial order were appealable.

Lewis v. United States,91 Justice Blackmun’s second Lifted
opinion for the Court, uses the SG’s construction of the statute
in question as the basis for the resolution of the case and for the

11/10/2016 09:41:10

89. MacDonald Brief, supra note 83, at *43–*44.
90. MacDonald, 435 U.S. at 861.
91. 445 U.S. 55 (1980).
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This Court has recognized that
one of the principal reasons for its
strict adherence to the doctrine of
finality in criminal cases is that
“[t]he
Sixth
Amendment
guarantees a speedy trial.”
DiBella v. United States, supra,
369 U.S. at 126. The . . .
compelling societal interest in the
swift punishment of the guilty
and the prompt exoneration of the
innocent . . . would be severely
compromised if every contested
legal question arising in the
course of a criminal proceeding
could be resolved in a separate
appeal before trial of the general
issue.89

Our conclusion, however, is
reinforced by the important
policy considerations that
underlie both the Speedy Trial
Clause and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
.....
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reasoning to support it. The following passages present some
examples:
It thus stands in contrast with
other federal statutes that
explicitly permit a defendant to
challenge, by way of defense, the
validity or constitutionality of the
predicate felony. See, e. g., 18 U.
S. C. § 3575(e) (dangerous
special offender) and 21 U. S. C.
§ 851(c)(2) (recidivism under the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of
93
1970).

The structure of Title IV of the
Omnibus Act, which was enacted
simultaneously with Title VII,
reinforces that conclusion. Like
Title VII, Title IV prohibits
various
categories
of
presumptively dangerous persons
from transporting and receiving
firearms. 18 U.S.C. 922 (g) and
922(h). . . . Thus, with regard to
the statutory question at issue
here, there is no significant
difference between title IV and
Title VII. Both statutes seek to
keep firearms away from “any
person . . . who has been
convicted . . .” of a felony.94

The very structure of the
Omnibus Act’s Title IV, enacted
simultaneously with Title VII,
reinforces this conclusion. Each
Title prohibits categories of
presumptively dangerous persons
from transporting or receiving
firearms. See 18 U. S. C. §§ 922
(g) and (h). Actually, with regard
to the statutory question at issue
here, we detect little significant
difference between Title IV and
Title VII. Each seeks to keep a
firearm away from “any person
. . . who has been convicted” of a
95
felony.

11/10/2016 09:41:10

92. Brief for United States at *17–*18, Lewis v. United States, 1979 WL 213815 (Nov.
3, 1979) (No. 78-1595) [hereinafter Lewis Brief].
93. Lewis, 445 U.S. at 62.
94. Lewis Brief, supra note 92, at *24–*25.
95. Lewis, 445 U.S. at 63–64.
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In our view, this particular
omission is especially indicative
of congressional intent, since
other federal statutes involving
prior
convictions
explicitly
permit the accused to challenge
the validity or constitutionality of
the predicate felony as a defense.
See Section 411(c)(2) of the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of
92
1970.
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Congress
could
rationally
conclude
that
any
felony
conviction, even an allegedly
invalid one, is a sufficient basis
on which to prohibit the
possession of a firearm. See, e. g.,
United States v. Ransom, 515
97
F.2d 885, 891–892.

The
express
congressional
purpose in enacting Title VII is
set forth in the statute itself. [T]he
receipt,
possession,
or
transportation of a firearm by
felons constitutes . . . a threat to
the continued and effective
operation of the Government of
the United States. . . . 18 U.S.C.
App. 1201. . . . [T]he legislative
history of the gun control laws
“evidences
Congress’
deep
concern
about
the
easy
availability of firearms, especially
to those who . . . pose a greater
threat to community peace. . . .”
And . . . Congress focused on the
substantial nexus between violent
crimes and the possession of
firearms by “any person who has
a criminal record.” 114 Cong.
Rec. 13220 (1968) (remarks of
Sen. Tydings); . . . 16298
98
(remarks of Rep. Pollock).

Congress, as its expressed
purpose in enacting Title VII
reveals, 18 U. S. C. App. §1201,
was concerned that the receipt
and possession of a firearm by a
felon constitutes a threat, among
other things, to the continued and
effective operation of the
Government of the United States.
The legislative history of the gun
control laws discloses Congress’
worry about the easy availability
of firearms, especially to those
persons who pose a threat to
community peace. And Congress
focused on the nexus between
violent crime and the possession
of a firearm by any person with a
criminal record. 114 Cong. Rec.
13220 (1968) (remarks of Sen.
Tydings); . . . 16298 (remarks of
99
Rep. Pollock)

Lewis Brief, supra note 92, at *41.
Lewis, 445 U.S. at 66.
Lewis Brief, supra note 92, at *40–*41.
Lewis, 445 U.S. at 66.
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96.
97.
98.
99.
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Congress rationally concluded
that any felony conviction—even
an allegedly invalid one—is a
sufficient basis on which to
prohibit the possession of
firearms. See, e.g., United States
v. Samson, supra, 533 F.2d at
722; United States v. Ransom,
515 F.2d 885, 891–892 (5th Cir.
96
1975). . . .
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The Lewis Court also follows the SG’s rationale for the
rejection of petitioner’s construction of the relevant statute:
“[R]esort to an alternative
construction to avoid deciding a
constitutional
question
is
appropriate only when such a
course is ‘fairly possible’ or when
the statute provides a ‘fair
alternative’ construction.” Swain
v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 378
100
n.11 (1977).

With the face of the statute and
the legislative history so clear,
petitioner’s argument that the
statute nevertheless should be
construed so as to avoid a
constitutional issue is inapposite.
That course is appropriate only
when the statute provides a fair
alternative construction. This
statute could not be more plain.
Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 373,
101
378, and n. 11.

And finally the opinion adopts, nearly verbatim, the SG’s
assessment of the Court’s own precedent:

Lewis Brief, supra note 92, at *36.
Lewis, 445 U.S. at 65.
Lewis Brief, supra note 92, at *42.
Lewis, 445 U.S. at 66.

11/10/2016 09:41:10

100.
101.
102.
103.

This Court has recognized
repeatedly that a legislature
constitutionally may prohibit a
convicted felon from engaging in
activities far more fundamental
than the possession of a firearm.
See Richardson v. Ramirez,
418
U.S.
24
(1974)
(disenfranchisement); DeVeau v.
Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960)
(proscription against holding
office in a waterfront labor
organization); Hawker v. New
York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898)
(prohibition against the practice
103
of medicine).
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And this Court has repeatedly
recognized that a legislature may
constitutionally prohibit convicted
felons from engaging in activities
far more fundamental than the
right to possess firearms at issue
here. See Richardson v. Ramirez,
418
U.S.
24
(1974)
(disenfranchisement of felons);
DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S.
144, 157-160 (1960) (felons
barred
from
waterfront
employment); Hawker v. New
York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898) [58]
(prohibition on medical practice
102
by a felon).
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To be sure, the Court has made
clear
that
an
outstanding
uncounselled felony conviction
cannot reliably be used for certain
purposes. See Burgett v. Texas,
389 U.S. 109 (1967); United
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443
(1972); Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S.
473 (1972). But the Court has
never
suggested
that
an
uncounselled
conviction
is
invalid for all purposes (see, e.g.,
104
Scott v. Illinois, supra).

We recognize, of course, that
under the Sixth Amendment an
uncounseled felony conviction
cannot be used for certain
purposes. See Burgett, Tucker,
and Loper, all supra. The Court,
however, has never suggested that
an uncounseled conviction is
invalid for all purposes. See Scott
105
v. Illinois.

In each of those cases this Court
found that the conviction or
sentence in question violated the
Sixth Amendment because it
depended upon the reliability of a
particular uncounselled conviction
in the past. The federal gun laws,
however, focus on the mere fact
of conviction, regardless of its
reliability, in order to keep
firearms away from potentially
106
dangerous people.

In each of those cases, this Court
found that the subsequent
conviction or sentence violated
the Sixth Amendment because it
depended upon the reliability of a
past uncounseled conviction. The
federal gun laws, however, focus
not on reliability, but on the mere
fact of conviction, or even
indictment, in order to keep
firearms away from potentially
107
dangerous persons.

Lewis Brief, supra note 92, at *45.
Lewis, 445 U.S. at 66–67.
Lewis Brief, supra note 92, at *48.
Lewis, 445 U.S. at 67.
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104.
105.
106.
107.
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The high level of similarity between the SG’s brief and the
opinion in Lewis reinforces the conclusion that the trust and faith
that Justice Blackmun and his clerks placed in the SG makes
Lifted opinions more likely in cases involving the SG. This
pattern continues through the remainder of Justice Blackmun’s
Lifted opinions for the Court, which all rely heavily on the
language from the SG’s briefs.
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DiFrancesco v. United States,108 is yet another Blackmun
opinion for the Court in which the opinion language parallels
that in the SG’s brief, utilizing the same linguistic framework as
the SG’s brief to interpret the Court’s precedent:
This is justified on the ground
that, however mistaken the
acquittal may have been, there
would be an unacceptably high
risk that the Government, with its
superior resources, would wear
down a defendant, thereby
“enhancing the possibility that
even though innocent he may be
found guilty.” Green v. United
110
States, 355 U.S., at 188.

The decisions of this Court in the
sentencing area have also
established that a sentence does
not
have
qualities
of
constitutional finality comparable
111
to an acquittal.

This Court’s decisions in the
sentencing area clearly establish
that a sentence does not have the
qualities of constitutional finality
112
that attend an acquittal.

The
multiple
punishment
guarantee that has evolved in the
holdings of this Court, apart from
the Benz dictum, clearly is not
involved in this case. . . . As in Ex

The guarantee against multiple
punishment that has evolved in
the holdings of this Court plainly
is not involved in this case. As Ex
parte Lange demonstrates, a

11/10/2016 09:41:10

108. 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
109. Brief for the United States at *21, DiFrancesco v. United States, 1980 WL 339988
(U.S. May 28, 1980) (No. 79-567) [hereinafter DiFrancesco Brief].
110. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 130.
111. DiFrancesco Brief, supra note 109, at *28 (discussing Bozza v. United States, 330
U.S. 160 (1947)).
112. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 134 (discussing Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160
(1947)).
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This rule has been characterized
as
attaching
“particular
significance to an acquittal”
(United States v. Scott, supra, 437
U.S. at 91), and it has been
justified on the basis that “[t]o
permit a second trial after an
acquittal, however mistaken the
acquittal may have been, would
present an unacceptably high risk
that the Government, with its
vastly superior resources, might
wear down the defendant so that
‘even though innocent he may be
109
found guilty.’” Ibid.
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parte Lange, a defendant may not
receive a higher sentence than
that
authorized
by
the
legislature. . . . Clearly, no double
jeopardy problem would have
been presented in Ex parte Lange
if Congress had established that
the offense was punishable by
fine and imprisonment, even
though those are multiple
punishments. See Whalen v.
United States, supra, slip op. 4.
There is no question what
punishment was authorized by
Congress under 18 U.S.C. 3575
and 18 U.S.C. 3576 . . . .
Accordingly, 18 U.S.C. 3576
does not violate the guarantee
against multiple punishment that
is enunciated in Ex parte
113
Lange.

defendant may not receive a
greater
sentence
than
the
legislature has authorized. No
double jeopardy problem would
have been presented in Ex parte
Lange if Congress had provided
that the offense there was
punishable by both fine and
imprisonment, even though that is
multiple punishment. See Whalen
v. United States, 445 U.S., at
688–689; . . . id., at 697–698
(concurring
opinion).
The
punishment
authorized
by
Congress under §§ 3575 and
3576 is clear and specific and,
accordingly, does not violate the
guarantee
against
multiple
punishment expounded by Ex
114
parte Lange.

DiFrancesco also tracks the reasoning and language in the
SG’s brief to explain the Court’s decision that the Double
Jeopardy Clause is not violated by allowing the government to
appeal:
The double jeopardy focus, thus,
is not on the appeal but on the
relief that is requested, and our
task is to determine whether a
criminal
sentence,
once
pronounced, is to be accorded
constitutional
finality
and
conclusiveness similar to that
which attaches to a jury’s verdict
of acquittal. We conclude that

11/10/2016 09:41:10

113. DiFrancesco Brief, supra note 109, at *46–*47 (emphasis in original).
114. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 139.
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of sentencing practices, the
pertinent holdings of this Court,
nor considerations of double
jeopardy policy supports such an
115
equation.

neither the history of sentencing
practices, nor the pertinent
rulings of this Court, nor even
considerations of double jeopardy
policy
support
such
an
116
equation.

Thus, appeal of a sentence would
seem to be a violation of double
jeopardy only if the original
pronouncement of sentence is to
be treated in the same way as an
acquittal and the appeal is to be
treated as a retrial. . . .
Essentially, the court of appeals’
theory is that the imposition of a
sentence should be treated, for
double jeopardy finality purposes,
as an “implied acquittal” of a
greater sentence. See Van
Alstyne, In Gideon’s Wake:
Harsher Penalties and the
“Successful” Criminal Appellant,
74 Yale L. J. 606, 634-635
117
(1965).

Appeal of a sentence, therefore,
would seem to be a violation of
double jeopardy only if the
original sentence, as pronounced,
is to be treated in the same way as
an acquittal is treated and the
appeal is to be treated in the same
way as a retrial. Put another way,
the argument would be that, for
double jeopardy finality purposes,
the imposition of the sentence is
an “implied acquittal” of any
greater sentence. See Van Alstyne,
In Gideon’s Wake: Harsher
Penalties and the “Successful”
Criminal Appellant, 74 Yale L. J.
118
606, 634-635 (1965).

While there is little American
experience with appellate review
of
sentences,
this
history
demonstrates that the common
law has never ascribed such
finality to a sentence as would

DiFrancesco Brief, supra note 109, at *20.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 132.
DiFrancesco Brief, supra note 109, at *21, *23.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 133.
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115.
116.
117.
118.

Thus it may be said with certainty
that history demonstrates that the
common law never ascribed such
finality to a sentence as would
prevent a legislative body from
authorizing its appeal by the
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prevent a legislature from
authorizing its appeal by the
prosecution. Indeed, several
countries that trace their legal
systems to the English common
law permit such appeals. See
Canada: Can. Rev. Stat. §§ 605
(1)(b) and 748(b)(ii) (Martin’s
Annual Criminal Code (1979));
Australia (New South Wales):
Criminal Appeal Act of 1912, as
amended in 1924, 3 Pub. Acts
N.S.W. § 5D (1959); New
Zealand: Crimes Act 1961, as
amended
by
the
Crimes
Amendment Act of 1966, 1 Repr.
Stat. N.Z. § 383 (a) (1979).119

prosecution. Indeed, countries
that trace their legal systems to
the English common law permit
such appeals. See Can. Rev. Stat.
§§ 605(1)(b) and 748(b)(ii)
(1970), Martin’s Annual Criminal
Code 523, 636 (E. Greenspan ed.
1979); New Zealand Crimes Act
1961, as amended by the Crimes
Amendment Act of 1966, 1 Repr.
120
Stat. N. Z. § 383(2) (1979).

Like the opinion in Lewis, Justice Blackmun’s opinion for
the Court in Dickerson v. New Banner Institute121 deals with
sentencing. As happens often in a Lifted case involving the SG,
the Dickerson Court actually adopts both the SG’s interpretation
of Lewis as a precedent and the SG’s explanation of why the
Court should differentiate its reasoning in this case:
In Lewis, it is true, we recognized
an obvious exception to the literal
language of the statute for one
whose predicate conviction had
been vacated or reversed on direct
appeal. 445 U.S., at 61, n. 5; see
Note, Prior Convictions and the
Gun Control Act of 1968, 76
Colum. L. Rev. 326, 334, n. 42
(1976).
But,
in
contrast,
expunction does not alter the
legality
of
the
previous

11/10/2016 09:41:10

119. DiFrancesco Brief, supra note 109, at *27.
120. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 134.
121. 460 U.S. 103 (1983).
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convictions have been reversed or
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applicable to persons whose
convictions have been expunged.
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entirely
different
footing.
Expunction does not call into
question the legality of the
previous conviction, and it does
not signify that the defendant was
innocent of the crime for which
he was convicted. As explained
below (pages 30–35, infra),
expunction merely means that the
responsible
jurisdiction
has
decided not to accord the
conviction certain continuing
122
effects.

conviction and does not signify
that the defendant was innocent
of the crime to which he pleaded
guilty. Expunction in Iowa means
no more than that the State has
provided a means for the trial
court not to accord a conviction
certain continuing effects under
123
state law.

There seems little doubt that
firearms
disabilities
may
constitutionally be attached to an
expunged conviction (see Lewis
v. United States, supra, 445 U.S.
at 65–68), and an exception for
such
convictions,
unlike
convictions reversed or vacated
due to legal error, is far from
124
obvious.

Clearly, firearms disabilities may
be attached constitutionally to an
expunged conviction, see Lewis v.
United States, 445 U.S., at 65–68
. . . , and an exception for such a
conviction, unlike one reversed or
vacated due to trial error, is far
125
from obvious.

We have found nothing in the Although we have searched
legislative history of the Gun diligently, we have found nothing
Control Act or related federal in the legislative history of Title

11/10/2016 09:41:10

122. Brief for Petitioner at 8, 13–28, Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., 460 U.S. 103 (U.S.
June 1982) (No. 81-1180) [hereinafter Dickerson Brief].
123. Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 115.
124. Dickerson Brief, supra note 122, at 13.
125. Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 115.
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IV or related federal firearms
statutes that suggests, even
remotely, that a state expunction
was intended automatically to
remove the disabilities imposed
by §§ 922(g)(1) and (h)(1). See, e.
g., S. Rep. No. 1501, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1968); S. Rep. No.
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1968); H. R. Rep. No. 1577,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); H.
R. Conf. Rep. No. 1956, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); H. R.
Rep. No. 488, 90th Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1968). This lack of
evidence is significant for several
reasons. First, the purpose of the
statute would be frustrated by a
ruling that gave effect to state
expunctions; a state expunction
typically does not focus upon the
question with which Title IV is
concerned, namely, whether the
convicted person is fit to engage
in the firearms business or to
127
possess a firearm.

Second, . . . ‘‘‘[i]n the absence of
a plain indication to the contrary
it is to be assumed when
Congress enacts a statute that it
does not intend to make its
application dependent on state

Second, ‘‘‘in the absence of a
plain indication to the contrary. . .
it is to be assumed when
Congress enacts a statute that it
does not intend to make its
application dependent on state

11/10/2016 09:41:10

126. Dickerson Brief, supra note 122, at 25–27 (footnote omitted).
127. Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 119.
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firearms laws that even faintly
suggests that state expunctions
were intended automatically to
remove the disabilities imposed
by 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and
(h)(1), and neither the court
below nor respondent has cited
any such proof. This lack of
evidence is highly significant for
several reasons. First, the purpose
of the Gun Control Act will be
frustrated by the decision of the
court of appeals. That decision
would require the Secretary to
grant dealer and manufacturer
licenses to organizations directed
by individuals convicted of
serious criminal offenses (or to
such individuals themselves)
whenever the conviction in
question has been expunged
under state law. This would result
even though state expunctions
typically do not focus upon the
question with which the Gun
Control Act is concerned, i.e.,
whether the convicted person is
fit to engage in the firearms
business or to possess, ship,
126
transport, or receive firearms.
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law.’” NLRB v. Natural Gas
Utility Dist., 402 U.S. 600, 603
(1971),
quoting
NLRB
v.
Randolph Electric Membership
Corp., 343 F.2d 60, 62–63 (CA4
1965). This is because the
application of federal legislation
is nationwide and at times the
federal program would be
impaired if state law were to
control. Jerome v. United States,
318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943). . . .
The legislative history reveals
that Congress believed a uniform
national program was necessary
to assist in curbing the illegal use
of firearms. See S. Rep. No.
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 28,
76–77 (1968). Third, Title IV “is
a carefully constructed package
of gun control legislation. . .
‘Congress knew the significance
and meaning of the language it
employed.’” Scarborough v.
United States, 431 U.S., at 570,
quoting Barrett v. United States,
423 U.S., at 217. And Congress
carefully crafted a procedure for
removing those disabilities in
129
appropriate cases. § 925(c).

As noted above, the Gun Control
Act “is a carefully constructed
package
of
gun
control
legislation,” (Scarborough v.
United States, supra, 431 U.S. at

Congress, in framing it, took
pains to avoid the very problems
that the Court of Appeals’
decision inevitably would create,
such as individualized federal

11/10/2016 09:41:10

128. Dickerson Brief, supra note 122, at 27 (brackets in original).
129. Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 119–20.
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law.’” NLRB v. Natural Gas
Utility District, 402 U.S. 600, 603
(1971),
quoting
NLRB
v.
Randolph Electric Membership
Corp., 343 F.2d 60 (4th Cir.
1965). . . . In Jerome v. United
States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943)
the Court explained. . . : “That
assumption is based on the fact
that the application of federal
legislation is nationwide and at
times on the fact that the federal
program would be impaired if
state law were to control” . . . .
[T]he legislative history reveals
that Congress believed a uniform
national program was necessary
to assist in curbing the illegal use
of firearms. See S. Rep. No.
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 28,
76–77 (1968). . . . Title IV “is a
carefully constructed package of
gun control legislation. . . .
‘Congress knew the significance
and meaning of the language it
employed.’” Scarborough v.
United States, supra, 431 U.S. at
570. As noted, Congress carefully
crafted a procedure for removing
those disabilities in appropriate
128
cases (see 18 U.S.C. 925(c)).
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570) and in framing its terms
Congress took pains to avoid the
very sort of problems that the
decision below will inevitably
create. The provisions of the Act
demonstrate
that
Congress
endeavored to prevent any
uncertainty concerning those
persons subject to disabilities by
virtue of prior convictions.
Congress used unambiguous
language in attaching gun control
disabilities to “any person . . .
who has been convicted” of a
qualifying offense (18 U.S.C.
130
922(g)(1) and (h)(1)).

treatment of every expunction
law. Congress used unambiguous
language in attaching gun control
disabilities to any person “who
has been convicted” of a
131
qualifying offense.

The Court also tracks the SG’s reasoning almost identically
in its discussion of similar state statutes:

11/10/2016 09:41:10

130. Dickerson Brief, supra note 122, at 41.
131. Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 122.

Over half the States have enacted
one or more statutes that may be
classified
as
expunction
provisions. . . . These statutes
differ, however, in almost every
particular. Some are applicable
only to young offenders, e. g.,
Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 780.621
and .622 (1982). Some are
available only
to persons
convicted of certain offenses, e.
g., N. J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:52-2(b)
(West 1982); others, however,
permit expunction of a conviction
for any crime including murder,
e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch.
276, § 100A (West Supp. 1982–
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More than half the states have
enacted one or more laws that
may be broadly classified as
expunction statutes. . . . The
various statutes differ, however,
in almost every particular. While
some are applicable only to
young offenders, others may be
invoked by adults. Some are
available only
to persons
convicted of certain offenses, but
others permit the expunction of a
conviction for any crime,
including murder. Some are
confined to first offenders, but
others permit relief to recidivists.
Some apply only to persons given
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1983). Some are confined to first
offenders, e. g., Okla. Stat., Tit.
22, § 991c (Supp. 1982). Some
are discretionary, e. g., Minn.
Stat. § 638.02(2) (Supp. 1982),
while
others
provide
for
automatic
expunction
under
certain circumstances, e. g., Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-912
133
(1978).

The statutes also vary widely in
the language employed to
describe what they are supposed
to do. Various statutes are said to
“expunge” the conviction, guilty
verdict, or guilty plea; “seal” the
file or record; “limit access” to
the convicted person’s “criminal
history.”. . . [O]nly a minority . . .
address . . . whether the expunged
conviction may be considered in
sentencing for a subsequent
offense, in setting bail on
subsequent charges, or . . .
whether the expunged conviction
may be used to impeach
testimony . . . and whether . . .
the convicted person may deny
the fact of conviction.134

The statutes vary in the language
employed to describe what they
do. Some speak of expunging the
conviction, others of “sealing”
the file or of causing the
dismissal of the charge. The
statutes also differ in their actual
effect. Some are absolute; others
are limited. Only a minority
address questions such as whether
the expunged conviction may be
considered in sentencing for a
subsequent offense or in setting
bail on a later charge, or whether
the expunged conviction may be
used for impeachment purposes,
or whether the convict may deny
135
the fact of his conviction.

By sharing the SG’s
buttresses its decision
combined with the high
opinion and the SG’s

Dickerson Brief, supra note 122, at 31–33 (footnotes omitted).
Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 121.
Dickerson Brief, supra note 122, at 34, 35 (footnotes omitted).
Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 121.
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132.
133.
134.
135.

reasoning in Dickerson, the Court
from multiple angles. Its doing so
level of language overlap between the
brief suggests that the respondent’s
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certain sentences or sentenced
under certain laws, while others
contain no such restriction. Some
but not all require a waiting
period following conviction.
Some are discretionary, while
others provide for automatic
expunction
under
certain
132
circumstances.
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arguments had very little influence on the Court’s opinion
language in Dickerson.
This pattern continues in Russello v. United States,136
another federal-crime-bill case with a Blackmun opinion for the
Court that frames the facts as laid out by the SG—and,
consequently, in a way unfavorable to the defendant. The Court,
for example, adopts the SG’s strong language to define the
ambiguous term “interest,” which is consequential in the case:
[T]he term “interest” comprehends
all forms of real and personal
property, including profits and
proceeds. This Court repeatedly
has relied upon the term “interest”
in defining the meaning of
“property” in the Due Process
Clause. . . . See Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601
138
. . . (1972).

It was undoubtedly because
Congress did not want the RICO
forfeiture provision to be limited
by “rigid, technical” (Perry v.
Sindermann, supra, 408 U.S. at
601) definitions drawn from other
areas of law that it selected the
broad term “interest” to describe
those things subject to forfeiture
under
Section
1963(a)(1).
Congress therefore selected the
term “interest.” . . . This choice
of language was fully consistent
with the pattern of the RICO
139
statute.

It undoubtedly was because
Congress did not wish the
forfeiture provision of § 1963(a)
to be limited by rigid and
technical definitions drawn from
other areas of the law that it
selected the broad term “interest”
to describe those things that are
subject to forfeiture under the
statute. Congress selected this
general term apparently because
it was fully consistent with the
pattern of the RICO statute in
utilizing terms and concepts of
140
breadth. . . .

11/10/2016 09:41:10

136. 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
137. Brief for the United States at 14, Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (May 1983)
(No. 82-472) [hereinafter Russello Brief].
138. Russello, 464 U.S. at 21.
139. Russello Brief, supra note 137, at 15, 16.
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undoubtedly comprehends all
forms of real and personal
property, including profits and
proceeds.
This
Court
has
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“interest” in defining the meaning
of “property” in the Due Process
Clause. . . . Perry v. Sinderman,
137
408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972).
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If Congress had intended to
restrict subsection (a)(1) to
interests in an enterprise, as
petitioner argues, it presumably
would have done so expressly, as
141
it did in subsection (a)(2).

65

Had Congress intended to restrict
§ 1963(a)(1) to an interest in an
enterprise, it presumably would
have done so expressly as it did
in the immediately following
142
subsection (a)(2).

As is the case with many Lifted opinions, the Russello
Court uses reasoning similar to that of the SG’s brief for
rejecting the opposing party’s contentions. But this feature
pervades the Russello opinion to a much greater extent than in
some Lifted opinions, as is evident in the following passages:

Russello, 464 U.S. at 21–22.
Russello Brief, supra note 137, at 21.
Russello, 464 U.S. at 23.
Russello Brief, supra note 137, at 17 (footnote omitted).

11/10/2016 09:41:10

140.
141.
142.
143.

Petitioner himself has not
attempted to define the term
“interest” as used in § 1963(a)(1).
He insists, however, that the term
does not reach money or profits
because, he says: “‘interest,’ by
definition, includes of necessity
an interest in something.” Brief
for Petitioner 9. . . . We do not
agree. Every property interest,
including a right to profits or
proceeds, may be described as an
interest in something. Before
profits of an illegal enterprise are
divided, each participant may be
said to own an “interest” in the
ill-gotten gains. After distribution,
each will have a possessory
interest in currency or other items
144
so distributed.
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[P]etitioner has not attempted to
define the term “interest.”
Petitioner insists . . ., however,
that the term does not reach
profits and proceeds because
‘‘‘[i]nterest’,
by
definition,
includes of necessity an interest
in something.” . . . This argument
is plainly invalid. Every property
interest, including the ownership
of or right to receive profits or
proceeds, may be described as an
interest in something. Before the
profits of an illegal enterprise are
divided, each participant may be
said to own an “interest” in the
ill-gotten gain. After distribution,
each participant will have a
possessory or ownership interest
in currency, valuables, a bank
account, stocks, bonds, or the
143
like.
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It is no answer to say, as
petitioner
does,
Brief
for
Petitioner 17-18, that if the term
“interest”
were
as
allencompassing as suggested by the
majority opinion of the Court of
Appeals, § 1963(a)(2) would have
no meaning independent of §
1963(a)(1), and would be mere
surplusage. This argument is
plainly incorrect. Subsection
(a)(1) reaches “any interest,”
whether or not in an enterprise,
provided it was “acquired . . . in
violation of section 1962.”
Subsection (a)(2), on the other
hand, is restricted to an interest in
an enterprise, but that interest
itself need not have been illegally
146
acquired.

Petitioner also suggests (Br. 29–
33) that subsequent proposed
legislation demonstrates that the
1970 RICO forfeiture statute
excludes profits. This conclusion
is wholly unjustified. The bills in
question were introduced to
rectify Marubeni and similar
district court cases. Their
introduction hardly suggests that
their sponsors viewed those
decisions as correct interpretations
of 18 U.S.C. 1963(a)(1) as it
currently stands. See United
States v. Gordon, 638 F.2d 886,

The bills to which petitioner
refers, however, were introduced
in order to overcome the
decisions in Marubeni, Meyers,
and Thevis. See, e. g., S. 2320,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). The
introduction of these bills hardly
suggests that their sponsors
viewed those decisions as correct
interpretations of § 1963(a)(1).
See United States v. Gordon, 638
F.2d 886, 888, n. 5 (CA5), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 909 (1981). In
any event, it is well settled that
‘‘‘the views of a subsequent

11/10/2016 09:41:10

144. Russello, 464 U.S. at 22.
145. Russello Brief, supra note 137, at 22–23.
146. Russello, 464 U.S. at 24.
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Petitioner argues (Br. 17–18) that
if the term ‘‘‘interest’ were as all
encompassing as suggested by the
en banc decision below, 18
U.S.C. Sec. 1963(a)(2) would
have no meaning independent of
18 U.S.C. Sec. 1963(a)(1).” This
argument is plainly incorrect.
Section 1963(a)(1) reaches “any
interest,” whether or not in an
enterprise, provided that the
interest was “acquired or
maintained in violation of section
1962.” Section 1963(a)(2), on the
other hand, is restricted to
interests in an enterprise, but the
interest itself need not have been
illegally
acquired
or
145
maintained.
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Congress form a hazardous basis
for inferring the intent of an
earlier one.’” Jefferson County
Pharmaceutical Assn. v. Abbott
Laboratories, 460 U.S. 150, 165,
n. 27 (1983), quoting from United
States v. Price, [361 U.S. 304,
313] . . . (1960). See, also,
United States v. Clark, 445 U.S.
148
23, 33, n. 9 . . . (1980).

For the same reasons, petitioner’s
argument draws no support from
the fact that certain state
racketeering
laws
provide
expressly for the forfeiture of
“profits,” “money,” or “all
property, real or personal,”
acquired from racketeering (see
Pet. Br. 8–9). With one
exception, all of the state
provisions upon which petitioner
relies postdate federal court
decisions barring the forfeiture of
racketeering profits under the
federal law. See United States v.
Meyers, 432 F. Supp. 456 (W.D.
Pa. 1977); United States v.
Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134 (N.D.
Ga. 1979). Undoubtedly aware of
the problems created by such
decisions, the legislatures of these
states presumably employed
language different from that in 18

Neither are we persuaded by
petitioner’s argument that his
position is supported by the fact
that certain state racketeering
statutes expressly provide for the
forfeiture of “profits,” “money,”
“interest or property,” or “all
property, real or personal,”
acquired from racketeering. Brief
for Petitioner 8-9. Nearly all of
the state statutes postdate the
Meyers and Thevis district court
decisions. See, e. g., Colo. Rev.
Stat. Sec. 18-17-106 (Supp. 1982)
(enacted in 1981); R.I. Gen. Laws
§ 7-15-3 (Supp. 1982) (enacted in
1981). The legislatures of those
States presumably employed
language different from that of
Sec. 1963(a)(1) so as to avoid
narrow interpretations of their
laws along the lines of the narrow
interpretations given the federal

11/10/2016 09:41:10

147. Russello Brief, supra note 137, at 31–32 (footnote omitted).
148. Russello, 464 U.S. at 25–26.
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888 n.5 (5th Cir. 1981). And, in
any event, it is settled that ‘‘‘the
views of a subsequent Congress
form a hazardous basis for
inferring the intent of an earlier
one.’”
Jefferson
County
Pharmaceutical Association v.
Abbott Laboratories, No. 81-827
(Feb. 23, 1983), slip op. 15 n.27,
quoting United States v. Price,
361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960). See
also United States v. Clark, 445
147
U.S. 23, 33 n.9 (1980).
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U.S.C. 1963(a)(1) in order to statute by the courts in Meyers
150
avoid similar interpretations of and Thevis.
149
their new racketeering laws.

Russello Brief, supra note 137, at 32–33 (footnote omitted).
Russello, 464 U.S. at 26.
Russello Brief, supra note 137, at 45–46.
Russello, 464 U.S. at 28–29.
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We are not persuaded otherwise
by the presence of a 1969 letter
from the then Deputy Attorney
General to Senator McClellan.
See Measures Relating to
Organized
Crime:
Hearings
before the Subcommittee on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of
the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.,
407 (1969). That letter, with its
reference to “one’s interest in the
enterprise” does not indicate, for
us, any congressional intent to
preclude
forfeiture
of
racketeering
profits.
The
reference, indeed, is not to §
1963(a) as finally enacted but to
an earlier version in which
forfeiture was to be expressly
limited to an interest in an
enterprise. The letter was merely
following the language of the
then pending bill. Furthermore,
the real purpose of the sentence
was not to explain what the
statutory provision meant, but to
explain why the Department of
Justice
believed
it
was
152
constitutional.

38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 38 Side B

As evidence that Congress did
not intend to reach racketeering
profits, petitioner points (Br. 14–
15) to a 1969 letter from then
Deputy
Attorney
General
Kleindienst to Senator McClellan
. . . . concerning an earlier version
of Section 1963(a)(1) (Senate
Hearings, supra , at 407). . . . The
court below correctly concluded
that this letter did not indicate a
congressional intent to preclude
forfeiture of racketeering profits.
The sentence at issue did not refer
to Section 1963(a) as finally
enacted but to an earlier version
in which forfeiture was expressly
limited to interests in an
enterprise. Thus, by stating that
forfeiture under Section 1963(a)
was “limited . . . to one’s interest
in the enterprise,” the letter was
merely following the language of
the bill then pending. Moreover,
the purpose of this sentence was
not to explain what the statutory
provision meant but to explain
why the Department of Justice
151
believed it was constitutional.
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Without delving into the psychology of the Justices and
their clerks, it is impossible to determine if they used
independent reasoning to reject the petitioner’s points in
Russello. But the high similarity between the language in the
opinion and the SG’s brief suggests that, at very least, the Court
found the SG’s arguments far more compelling than those made
by the respondent.
As in Russello, Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the Court in
United States v. National Bank of Commerce153 almost entirely
follows the linguistic template set forth in the SG’s brief. The
examples below show that the Court’s opinion uses language
about Congressional intent that is highly similar to that in the
SG’s brief:
The Court of Appeals’ conclusion
that Roy did not possess “property
[or] rights to property” on which
the IRS could levy rested heavily
on its understanding of the
Arkansas law of creditors’ rights,
particularly those in garnishment.
. . . As we have suggested, this
misconceives the role properly
played by state law in federal tax155
collection matters.

[T]he facts that under Arkansas
law Roy’s creditors (unlike Roy
himself) could not exercise his
right of withdrawal in their favor
. . . and would have to join his codepositors in a garnishment
proceeding . . . are irrelevant in
answering the question presented
here. The federal statute . . . refers

Thus, the facts that under
Arkansas law Roy’s creditors,
unlike Roy himself, could not
exercise his right of withdrawal
in their favor and in a
garnishment proceeding would
have to join his codepositors are
irrelevant. The federal statute
relates to the taxpayer’s rights to

11/10/2016 09:41:10

153. 472 U.S. 713 (1985).
154. Brief for the United States at *28–*29, United States v. National Bank of
Commerce, 1985 WL 669719 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1985) (No. 84-498) [hereinafter Nat’l Bank of
Commerce Brief].
155. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 727.
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In holding that Roy did not
possess “property [or] rights to
property” on which the IRS could
levy, the court of appeals relied
heavily on Arkansas creditors’
rights law. . . . This reasoning
seriously misconceives the role
properly played by state law in
154
federal tax collection matters.
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property and not to his creditors’
rights. The Court of Appeals
would remit the IRS to the rights
only an ordinary creditor would
have under state law. That result
“[compares] the government to a
class of creditors to which it is
superior.”
Randall
v.
H.
Nakashima & Co., 542 F.2d 270,
157
274, n.8 (CA5 1976).

In its solicitude for the potential
claims of Roy’s co-depositors,
the court of appeals has ignored
the statutory
scheme that
158
Congress established.

In its understandable concern for
Ruby’s and Neva’s property
interests, the Court of Appeals
has ignored the statutory scheme
established by Congress to
159
protect those rights.

As a final justification for
refusing to impose personal
liability on the bank, the court of
appeals theorized that an IRS
levy “is not normally intended for
use as against property in which
third parties have an interest” or
“as against property bearing on
its face the names of third
parties.” (Pet. App. 17a). The
court appeared to recognize that
Congress’s enactment of Section
7426—which permits wrongfullevy actions by “any person who
claims an interest in” seized
property—tended to undermine

The Court of Appeals’ final
justification for its holding was
its belief that an IRS levy “is not
normally intended for use as
against property in which third
parties have an interest” or “as
against property bearing on its
face the names of third parties,
and in which those third parties
likely have a property interest.”
726 F.2d, at 1300. The court
acknowledged the existence of
§ 7426 but felt that that statute
was designed to protect only
those third parties “whose
property
has
been
seized

Nat’l Bank of Commerce Brief, supra note 154, at *30 (emphasis in original).
Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 727.
Nat’l Bank of Commerce Brief, supra note 154, at *33.
Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 728.
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to the taxpayer’s property and
rights to property, not to his
creditor’s rights. Yet the court of
appeals has . . . deprived the . . .
statute of all independent force,
by remitting the IRS to only the
rights that an ordinary creditor . .
. would have under state law.
That result . . . is to “compare the
government to a class of creditors
to which it is superior” (Randall,
156
542 F.2d at 274 n.8).
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this theory. But the court ‘inadvertently.’” 726 F.2d, at
161
suggested that the Section 7426 1300.
remedy is designed to protect
only those third parties “whose
property
has
been
seized
‘inadvertently’”
(Pet.
App.
160
17a).

While the opinion in National Bank of Commerce utilizes
the SG brief throughout, relying especially on its legal
reasoning, the opinion in United States v. Hughes Properties162
utilizes language and reasoning from the SG’s brief to interpret
and apply the Court’s precedent. Some examples include:
The
Court’s
cases
have
emphasized that “a liability does
not accrue as long as it remains
contingent.” Brown v. Helvering,
291 U.S. 193, 200 . . . (1934);
accord, Dixie Pine Products Co.
v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 516,
519 . . . (1944). Thus, to satisfy
the all-events test, a liability must
be “final and definite in amount,”
Security Flour Mills Co. v.
Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281, 287
. . . (1944), must be “fixed and
absolute,” Brown v. Helvering,
291 U.S., at 201 . . . , and must be
“unconditional,” Lucas v. North
Texas Lumber Co., 281 U.S. 11,
164
13 . . . (1930).

11/10/2016 09:41:10

160. Nat’l Bank of Commerce Brief, supra note 154, at *36–*37.
161. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 729–30.
162. 476 U.S. 593 (1986).
163. Brief for the United States at 8, United States v. Hughes Properties, 476 U.S. 593
(Feb. 1986) (No. 85-554) [hereinafter Hughes Properties Brief] (brackets in original).
164. Hughes Properties, 476 U.S. at 600.
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This Court has consistently held
that a liability does not accrue for
purposes of the “all events” test
as long as it remains contingent.
Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S.
193, 200 (1934). To be deductible
for tax purposes, “the obligation
to pay [must] ha[ve] become final
and definite.” Security Flour
Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321
U.S. 281, 287 (1944). It must be
“unconditional.” Lucas v. North
Texas Lumber Co., 281 U.S. 11,
163
13 (1930).
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Rather, “the tax law requires that
a deduction be deferred until ‘all
the events’ have occurred that
will make it fixed and certain”
(Thor Power Tool Co., 439 U.S.
165
at 543).

And one may say that “the tax
law requires that a deduction be
deferred until ‘all the events’
have occurred that will make it
fixed and certain.” Thor Power
Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439
166
U.S. 522, 543 . . . (1979).

Congress’s decision to grant the
Commissioner “broad powers” to
depart from the taxpayer’s usual
accounting practice in computing
taxable income owes in part to
“the vastly different objectives
that financial and tax accounting
have.” Thor Power Tool Co., 439
U.S. at 542. “The primary goal of
financial accounting is to provide
useful
information
to
management, shareholders, [and]
creditors” and “to protect these
parties from being misled” (ibid.).
. . . “[T]he major responsibility of
the Internal Revenue Service,” by
contrast, “is to protect the public
167
fisc.”

The Court has long recognized
“the vastly different objectives
that financial and tax accounting
have.” Thor Power Tool Co. v.
Commissioner, 439 U.S., at 542. .
. . The goal of financial
accounting is to provide useful
and pertinent information to
management, shareholders, and
creditors. On the other hand, the
major responsibility of the
Internal Revenue Service is to
168
protect the public fisc. Ibid.

This Court has . . . recognized the This Court has recognized the
government’s
“compelling Government’s
“compelling
interest” in withholding national interest” in withholding national
Hughes Properties Brief, supra note 163, at 10.
Hughes Properties, 476 U.S. at 600–01.
Hughes Properties Brief, supra note 163, at 24 (brackets in original).
Hughes Properties, 476 U.S. at 603.
484 U.S. 518 (1988).
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165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 40 Side B

In Department of the Navy v. Egan,169 in which Justice
Blackmun again wrote for the Court, the opinion adopts the
caselaw and statutory analysis provided in the SG’s brief as the
basis for its interpretation and application of precedent:
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security
information
from
unauthorized persons in the
course of executive business.
Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S.
507, 509, n. 3 . . . (1980). See
also United States v. Robel, 389
U.S. 258, 267 . . . (1967); United
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10
. . . The authority to protect such
information falls on the President
as head of the Executive Branch
171
and as Commander in Chief.

National security matters, as this
Court has recognized, are “the
province and responsibility of the
executive.” Haig v. Agee, 453
U.S. 280, 293–294, 304 (1981).
“As to these areas of Art. II duties
the courts have traditionally
shown the utmost deference to
Presidential
responsibilities.”
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 710 (1974). Absent an
unambiguous grant of jurisdiction
by Congress, courts have
traditionally been reluctant to
intrude upon the authority of the
executive in military and national
security affairs. See, e.g., Orloff
v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93–
94 (1953); Burns v. Wilson, 346
U.S. 137, 142, 144 (1953);
Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1,
10 (1973); Schlesinger v.
Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757-

The Court also has recognized
“the generally accepted view that
foreign policy was the province
and
responsibility
of
the
Executive.” Haig v. Agee, 453
U.S. 280, 293–294 . . . (1981).
“As to these areas of Art. II duties
the courts have traditionally
shown the utmost deference to
Presidential
responsibilities.”
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 710 . . . (1974). Thus, unless
Congress
specifically
has
provided
otherwise,
courts
traditionally have been reluctant
to intrude upon the authority of
the Executive in military and
national security affairs. See, e.g.,
Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S.
83, 93–94 . . . (1953); Burns v.
Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142, 144
. . . (1953); Gilligan v. Morgan,
413 U.S. 1, 10 . . . (1973),

11/10/2016 09:41:10

170. Brief for Petitioner at *15–*16, Department of the Navy v. Egan, 1987 WL 880362
(U.S. Aug. 10, 1987) (No. 86-1552) [hereinafter Egan Brief].
171. Egan, 484 U.S. at 527.
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security
information
from
unauthorized persons in the
course of executive business
(Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S.
507, 509 n.3 (1980) . . .). See,
e.g., United States v. Robel, 389
U.S. 258, 267 (1967); United
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10
(1953). . . . The authority and the
solemn obligation to protect such
information fall on the President
as head of the Executive Branch
170
and Commander in Chief.
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758 (1975); Chappell v. Wallace,
462 U.S. 296 (1983). The court of
appeals’ contrary holding . . . puts
172
the matter backwards.

Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420
U.S. 738, 757–758 . . . (1975);
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S.
296 . . . (1983).We feel that the
contrary conclusion of the Court
of Appeals’ majority is not in line
173
with this authority.

The Egan Court’s language also tracks that from the brief
regarding the policy rationale of the case and its implications:
It should be obvious that no one
hasa “right” to a security clearance.
The grant of a clearance requires
an affirmative act of discretion on
the part of the granting official.
The general standard is that a
clearance may be granted only
when “clearly consistent with the
interests of the national security.”
See, e. g., Exec. Order No. 10450,
Sec. Sec. 2 and 7, 3 CFR 936,
938 (1949–1953 Comp.); 10 CFR
Sec.710.10(a)(1987) (Department
of Energy); 32 CFR Sec. 156.3(a)
(1987)
(Department
of
175
Defense).

A clearance determination . . . is A clearance does not equate with
not a judgment of an individual or passing judgment upon an
Egan Brief, supra note 170, at *20–*21.
Egan, 484 U.S. at 529–30.
Egan Brief, supra note 170, at *17–*18.
Egan, 484 U.S. at 528.
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No individual has a “right” to a
security clearance. Under long
established principles, the grant
of a security clearance requires an
affirmative act of discretion on
the part of the granting official
based on a high degree of
confidence in the grantee. . . . The
general standard therefore is that
a clearance may be granted only
when “clearly consistent with the
interests of the national security.”
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 10,450,
Sec. Sec. 2, 7, 3 C.F.R. 936, 938
(1949–1953 Comp.); OPNAV
INST 5510.1F, para. 16-100(1);
10 C.F.R. 710.10(a) (Department
of Energy regulation); 32 C.F.R.
156.3(a) (Department of Defense
regulation);
Department
of
Defense Regulation 5200.2-R,
174
para. 6-100(a) (Dec. 1979).
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individual’s character. Instead, it
is only an attempt to predict his
possible future behavior and to
assess whether, under compulsion
of circumstances or for other
reasons, he might compromise
sensitive information. It may be
based, to be sure, upon past or
present conduct, but it also may
be
based
upon
concerns
completely unrelated to conduct,
such as having close relatives
residing in a country hostile to the
177
United States.

Such predictive judgments must
be made by those with the
necessary expertise in protecting
classified
information.
For
“reasons . . . too obvious to call
for enlarged discussion” (CIA v.
Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 170 (1985)),
the protection of classified
information must be committed to
the broad discretion of the
agencies responsible . . . , and this
must include broad discretion to
judge who may have access to it.
It is not reasonably possible for
an outside, nonexpert body to
review the substance of such a
judgment and decide whether,
under the “clearly consistent”
standard, the agency should have
been able to make the necessary
affirmative prediction with the
178
necessary confidence.

Predictive judgment of this kind
must be made by those with the
necessary expertise in protecting
classified
information.
For
“reasons. . . too obvious to call
for enlarged discussion,” CIA v.
Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 170 . . .
(1985),
the
protection
of
classified information must be
committed to the broad discretion
of the agency responsible, and
this must include broad discretion
to determine who may have
access to it. Certainly, it is not
reasonably possible for an outside
nonexpert body to review the
substance of such a judgment and
to decide whether the agency
should have been able to make
the
necessary
affirmative
179
prediction with confidence.

11/10/2016 09:41:10

176. Egan Brief, supra note 170, at *18.
177. Egan, 484 U.S. at 528–29.
178. Egan Brief, supra note 170, at *19.
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his past conduct. It is an attempt
to predict his future behavior, to
assess whether he might . . .
under
the
compulsion
of
circumstances beyond his control,
compromise sensitive information.
The prediction may be based upon
the individual’s past or present
conduct; but it may also be based
upon concerns unrelated to an
individual’s conduct, such as
whether he has close relatives
residing in a country that is
176
hostile to the United States.
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Nor can such a body determine
what constitutes an acceptable
margin of error in assessing the
potential risk that confidential
information will be compromised.
Accordingly, this Court has
acknowledged that with respect to
employees in sensitive positions
“there is a reasonable basis for
the view that an agency head who
must bear the responsibility for
the protection of classified
information committed to his
custody should have the final say
in deciding whether to repose his
trust in an employee who has
access to such information.” Cole
v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 546
180
(1956).

Nor can such a body determine
what constitutes an acceptable
margin of error in assessing the
potential
risk.
The
Court
accordingly has acknowledged
that with respect to employees in
sensitive positions “there is a
reasonable basis for the view that
an agency head who must bear
the
responsibility
for
the
protection
of
classified
information committed to his
custody should have the final say
in deciding whether to repose his
trust in an employee who has
access to such information.” Cole
v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 546 . . .
181
(1956).

In John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp.,182 the Court
examined an exemption under the federal Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA). Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the
Court relies on the SG’s brief primarily for the interpretation of
the relevant statutory provisions:

Egan, 484 U.S. at 529.
Egan Brief, supra note 170, at *20 (emphasis in original).
Egan, 484 U.S. at 529.
493 U.S. 146 (1989).

11/10/2016 09:41:10

179.
180.
181.
182.

If, despite what we regard as the
plain meaning of the statutory
language, it were necessary or
advisable
to
examine
the
legislative history of Exemption
7, as originally enacted and as
amended in 1974, we would
reach the same conclusion.
Justice Marshall, writing for the
Court in Robbins Tire, 437 U.S.,
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The Legislative History Of
Exemption 7, As Enacted And As
Amended In 1974, Confirms The
Plain Meaning Of Exemption 7.
. . . This
Court
thoroughly
discussed the legislative history
of Exemption 7 in NLRB v.
Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437
U.S. 214, 224–236 (1978). As
originally enacted, Exemption 7

38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 43 Side A

11/10/2016 09:41:10

FELDMANRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE)

11/7/2016 12:38 PM

BORROWED LANGUAGE IN SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

77

at 224–236, . . . discussed this
legislative history in detail. In its
original 1966 form, Exemption 7
permitted
nondisclosure
of
“investigatory files compiled for
law enforcement purposes except
to the extent available by law to a
private party.” Pub. L. 89-487,
§3(e)(7), 80 Stat. 251. But the
Court in Robbins Tire observed:
“Congress recognized that law
enforcement
agencies
had
legitimate needs to keep certain
records confidential, lest the
agencies be hindered in their
investigations or placed at a
disadvantage when it came time
to present their cases.” 437 U.S.,
184
at 224.

The legislative history of the
1974 amendments says nothing
about limiting Exemption 7 to
those documents originating as
185
law enforcement records.

The legislative history of the
1974 amendments says nothing
about limiting Exemption 7 to
those documents originating as
186
law-enforcement records.

This Court has consistently taken
a
practical
approach
to
interpreting FOIA in an effort to
apply a workable statutory
balance between the interests of
the public in greater access to
information and the needs of the
government in protecting certain

This Court consistently has taken
a practical approach when it has
been confronted with an issue of
interpretation of the Act. It has
endeavored to apply a workable
balance between the interests of
the public in greater access to
information and the needs of the

11/10/2016 09:41:10

183. Brief for Petitioner at *24, John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 1988 WL 1025573
(U.S. n.d.) (No. 88-1083) (beginning quoted matter with a section heading) [hereinafter
Doe Agency Brief].
184. Doe Agency, 493 U.S. at 155–56.
185. Doe Agency Brief, supra note 183, at *28 (emphasis in original).
186. Doe Agency, 493 U.S. at 157.

38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 43 Side A

permitted
nondisclosure
of
“investigatory files compiled for
law enforcement purposes except
to the extent available by law to a
private party.” 80 Stat. 251. By
that
exemption,
“Congress
recognized that law enforcement
agencies had legitimate needs to
keep certain records confidential,
lest the agencies be hindered in
their investigations or placed at a
disadvantage when it came time
to present their cases.” Robbins
183
Tire, 437 U.S. at 224.
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kinds of information from
disclosure. See, e.g., EPA v.
Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973);
Department of the Air Force v.
Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361–362
(1976); Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455
U.S. 345, 352 (1982). In accord
with that approach, the Court looks
to the reasons for exemption from
FOIA’s mandatory disclosure
requirements in determining
whether the government has
properly invoked a particular
exemption. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S.
132, 148–154 (1975); FBI v.
Abramson, 456 U.S. at 630. In
applying Exemption 7, this Court
has looked carefully at the effect
that disclosure would have on the
interests that exemption seeks to
protect. In NLRB v. Robbins Tire
& Rubber Co., 437 U.S. at 242–
187
243. . . .

Government to protect certain
kinds of information from
disclosure. The Court looks to the
reasons for exemption from the
disclosure
requirements
in
determining
whether
the
Government
has
properly
invoked a particular exemption.
See e.g., NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 421 U.S. 132, 148–154
. . . (1975). In applying Exemption
7, the Court carefully has
examined
the
effect
that
disclosure would have on the
interest the exemption seeks to
protect. Robbins Tire, 437 U.S.,
188
at 242–243. . . .

The plain meaning of the word
“compile” does not permit such a
distinction [as made by the Court
of Appeals]. It is the pulling
together of materials that
constitutes the compiling. It does
not matter whence the documents
were obtained. . . . This Court

We
disagree
with
that
interpretation for, in our view, the
plain meaning of the word
“compile,” or, for that matter, of
its adjectival form “compiled,”
does not permit such refinement.
This Court itself has used the
word “compile” naturally to refer

11/10/2016 09:41:10

187. Doe Agency Brief, supra note 183, at *33.
188. Doe Agency, 493 U.S. at 157.
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The Doe Agency opinion also relies on the SG’s
interpretation of the lower court opinion and the SG’s
interpretation of the opposing parties’ arguments:
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even to the process of gathering
at one time records and
information that were generated
on an earlier occasion and for a
different purpose. See FBI v.
Abramson, 456 U.S., at 622, n. 5.
190
...

Even respondent has used the
noun form of the word
“compiled” in its ordinary sense
to refer to the gathering together
of documents, whether or not
they were generated or compiled
at an earlier time for a different
purpose. In its FOIA requests of
September 30, 1986, and
February 3, 1987, respondent
“ask[ed] that copies of the
requested materials be furnished
to us as soon as individual items
are available, and that your
response to this request not await
a compilation of all the materials
requested.” J.A. 21, 47–48. Thus
respondent, unlike the court of
appeals, obviously and quite
properly recognized that the
documents’
having
been
“compiled” once for the purpose
of routine audits would in no way
prevent their being compiled
again later for a different
191
purpose.

Respondent, too, has used the
word “compile” in its ordinary
sense to refer to the assembling of
documents, even though those
documents were put together at
an earlier time for a different
purpose. In its FOIA requests of
September 30, 1986, and
February 3, 1987, respondent
asked that the requested materials
be furnished as soon as they were
available, and that the response to
the request “not await a
compilation of all the materials
requested.” App. 21, 47-48. This
was a recognition, twice repeated,
that the documents having been
compiled once for the purpose of
routine
audits
were
not
disqualified
from
being
“compiled” again later for a
192
different purpose.

11/10/2016 09:41:10

189. Doe Agency Brief, supra note 183, at *19.
190. Doe Agency, 493 U.S. at 154.
191. Doe Agency Brief, supra note 183, at *21 (brackets and emphasis in original).
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itself has used the word
“compiled,” quite naturally, to
refer to the process of pulling
together at one time records and
information that were generated
(or even compiled) at an earlier
time and for different purposes.
In FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. at
189
622 n.5. . . .

38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 44 Side B

11/10/2016 09:41:10

FELDMANRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE)

80

11/7/2016 12:38 PM

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

[T]he ruling . . . is at odds with
the plain meaning of the
exemption.The . . . distinction . . .
drawn between documents that
were originally obtained for law
enforcement purposes and those
. . . not so originally obtained, but
later gathered . . . for law
enforcement purposes, finds no
193
support in the plain language.

We thus do not accept the
distinction the Court of Appeals
drew between documents that
originally were assembled for law
enforcement purposes and those
that were not so originally
assembled but were gathered later
for such purposes. The plain
language of Exemption 7 does
194
not permit such a distinction.

By adopting the SG’s positions regarding both the lower
court decision and the opposing parties’ contentions, the Doe
Agency Court aligns itself with the government’s perspective.
Reading linearly through an opinion with this extent of shared
reasoning leaves little room for one to speculate on the Court’s
conclusions: The Court’s ultimate decision seems a foregone
conclusion.
In the constitutional case of University of Pennsylvania v.
EEOC,195 the Court’s opinion parallels the SG’s analysis of Title
VII provisions and the SG’s explanation for why the petitioner
interpreted these provisions incorrectly:

Doe Agency, 493 U.S. at 154–55.
Doe Agency Brief, supra note 183, at *22.
Doe Agency, 493 U.S. at 155.
493 U.S. 182 (1990).

11/10/2016 09:41:10

192.
193.
194.
195.

The effect of the elimination of
this exemption was to expose
tenure determinations to the
same enforcement procedures
applicable to other employment
decisions. This Court previously
has observed that Title VII “sets
forth ‘an integrated, multistep
enforcement procedure’ that
enables the Commission to detect
and
remedy
instances
of
discrimination.” EEOC v. Shell
Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 62 . . .
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The effect of the elimination of
Title VII’s exemption for
educational institutions was to
expose tenure determinations to
the same enforcement procedures
applicable to other employment
decisions. As this Court has
noted, Title VII creates ‘‘‘an
integrated, multistep enforcement
procedure’ that enables the
Commission to detect and remedy
instances of discrimination.”
EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S.
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(1984), quoting Occidental Life
Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355,
359 . . . (1977). The
Commission’s
enforcement
responsibilities are triggered by
the filing of a specific sworn
charge of discrimination. The Act
obligates the Commission to
investigate
a
charge
of
discrimination
to
determine
whether there is “reasonable
cause to believe that the charge is
true.” 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(b)
197
(1982 ed.).

If it finds no reasonable cause, the
Commission is obligated to
dismiss the charge. Ibid. If it does
find reasonable cause, the
Commission “endeavor[s] to
eliminate [the] alleged unlawful
employment practice by informal
methods
of
conference,
conciliation, and persuasion.”
Ibid. This requirement reflects
Congress’s wish “that violations
of the statute could be remedied
without resort to the courts.” . . .
If attempts at voluntary resolution
fail, the Commission may bring
198
an action against the employer.

If it finds no such reasonable
cause, the Commission is directed
to dismiss the charge. If it does
find reasonable cause, the
Commission shall “endeavor to
eliminate [the] alleged unlawful
employment practice by informal
methods
of
conference,
conciliation, and persuasion.”
Ibid. If attempts at voluntary
resolution fail, the Commission
may bring an action against the
199
employer.

11/10/2016 09:41:10

196. Brief for Respondent at *14, University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 1989 WL
1126944 (U.S. Aug. 15, 1989) (No. 88-493) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Penn Brief].
197. U. Penn, 493 U.S. at 190.
198. Penn Brief, supra note 196, at *14–*15.
199. U. Penn. 493 U.S. at 190–91 (brackets in original).
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54, 62 (1984) (citation omitted).
The efficacy of each step of that
procedure depends directly on the
Commission’s
unencumbered
access to information relevant to
alleged
discrimination.
The
Commission’s
enforcement
responsibilities are triggered by
the filing of a specific, sworn
charge of discrimination. The Act
obligates the Commission to
investigate
charges
of
discrimination
to
determine
whether “there is reasonable
cause to believe that the charge is
true.” Section 706(b) of Title VII,
196
42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b).
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To enable the Commission to
make informed decisions at each
stage of the enforcement process,
§ 2000e-8(a) confers a broad right
of access to relevant evidence:
“[T]he Commission or its
designated representative shall at
all reasonable times have access
to, for the purposes of
examination, and the right to
copy any evidence of any person
being investigated . . . that relates
to unlawful employment practices
covered by [the Act] and is
relevant to the charge under
investigation.” If an employer
refuses
to
provide
this
information voluntarily, the Act
authorizes the Commission to
issue a subpoena and to seek an
order enforcing it. §2000e-9
(incorporating
29
U.S.C.
201
§161).

Petitioner argues, nevertheless,
that Title VII leaves courts with
discretion to provide additional
protection for tenure review
documents. Although petitioner
recognizes that Title VII gives the
Commission broad “power to
seek access to all evidence that
may be ‘relevant to the charge
under investigation’” (Pet. Br.
38), it nevertheless contends that
Title VII’s subpoena enforcement
provisions do not give the

Petitioner argues, nevertheless,
that Title VII affirmatively grants
courts the discretion to require
more than relevance in order to
protect tenure-review documents.
Although petitioner recognizes
that Title VII gives the
Commission broad “power to
seek access to all evidence that
may be ‘relevant to the charge
under investigation,’” Brief for
Petitioner 38 (emphasis added), it
contends
that
Title
VII’s

11/10/2016 09:41:10

200. Penn Brief, supra note 196, at *15.
201. U. Penn. 493 U.S. at 191 (brackets in original).
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To enable the Commission to
make informed decisions at each
stage of the enforcement process,
Section 709(a) of Title VII, 42
U.S.C. 2000e-8(a), confers a
broad right of access to relevant
evidence: [T]he Commission or
its designated representative shall
. . . have access to, for the
purposes of examination, and the
right to copy any evidence of any
person being investigated . . . that
relates to unlawful employment
practices covered by [the Act]
and is relevant to the charge
under investigation. If employers
refuse to provide information
voluntarily, the Act authorizes the
Commission to issue subpoenas
and to seek orders enforcing
them. Section 710 of Title VII, 42
U.S.C. 2000e-9 (incorporating 29
200
U.S.C. 161).
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subpoena enforcement provisions
do not give the Commission an
unqualified right to acquire such
evidence. Id., at 38–41. This
interpretation simply cannot be
reconciled
with
the
plain
language of the text of § 2000e8(a), which states that the
Commission “shall . . . have
access” to “relevant” evidence
(emphasis added). The provision
can be read only as giving the
Commission a right to obtain that
evidence, not a mere license to
203
seek it.

Title
VII
anticipates
and
addresses situations in which an
employer may have an interest in
the confidentiality of its records.
The same Section that gives the
Commission access to any
evidence
relevant
to
its
investigations also makes it
“unlawful for any officer or
employee of the Commission to
make public in any manner
whatever
any
information
obtained by the Commission
pursuant to its authority under
this section prior to the institution
of any proceeding” under the Act.
. . . . Any violation of this
provision
subjects
the
Commission’s employees to
204
criminal penalties. Ibid.

Congress did address situations in
which an employer may have an
interest in the confidentiality of
its records. The same § 2000e-8
which gives the Commission
access to any evidence relevant to
its investigation also makes it
“unlawful for any officer or
employee of the Commission to
make public in any manner
whatever
any
information
obtained by the Commission
pursuant to its authority under
this section prior to the institution
of any proceeding” under the Act.
A violation of this provision
subjects the employee to criminal
205
penalties. Ibid.

Penn Brief, supra note 196, at *22 (emphasis in original).
U. Penn., 493 U.S. at 192 (emphasis in original).
Penn Brief, supra note 196, at *21.
U. Penn., 493 U.S. at 192.
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202.
203.
204.
205.
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Commission an unqualified right
to acquire such evidence. See
Pet.
Br.
38–41.
That
interpretation is untenable. First,
the plain language of Section
709(a) of Title VII, 42
U.S.C.2000e-8(a), states that the
Commission “shall . . . have
access” to relevant evidence; this
can only be read as giving the
Commission a right to that
evidence, not a mere “power to
202
seek” it.
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This deference to the SG’s interpretation of the statutory
scheme is also evident in C.I.R. v. Keystone Consolidated
Industries, Inc.206 The Keystone opinion uses some of the SG’s
language, and some similar to it, in interpreting the tax code, and
uses the same canons of interpretation. A few examples include:
Even if this phrase had not
possessed a settled meaning, it
still would be clear that
§ 4975(c)(1)(A) prohibits the
transfer of property in satisfaction
of a debt. Congress barred not
merely a “sale or exchange.” It
prohibited
something
more,
namely, “any direct or indirect
. . . sale or exchange.” The
contribution of property in
satisfaction
of
a
funding
obligation is at least both an
indirect type of sale and a form of
exchange, since the property is
exchanged for diminution of the
208
employer’s funding obligation.

Congress’s goal . . . was to bar
categorically transactions . . .
likely to injure pension plans. . . .
The transfer of property to a
pension plan in satisfaction of a
funding obligation can jeopardize
the ability of the plan to pay
209
promised benefits.

Congress’ goal was to bar
categorically a transaction that
was likely to injure the pension
plan. . . . . The transfer of
encumbered
property
may
jeopardize the ability of the plan
210
to pay promised benefits.

11/10/2016 09:41:10

206. 508 U.S. 152 (1993).
207. Brief for Petitioner at *17, C.I.R. v. Keystone Consolidated Industries, 1992 WL
547216 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1992) (No. 91-1677) [hereinafter Keystone Brief].
208. Keystone, 508 U.S. at 159.
209. Keystone Brief, supra note 207, at *18.
210. Keystone, 508 U.S. at 160.
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But even if “sale or exchange”
had not had a settled meaning
under the . . . Code, it would be
clear that Section 4975(c)(1)(A)
prohibits the transfer of property
in satisfaction of a debt. Congress
did not merely prohibit a “sale or
exchange,” it barred “any direct
or indirect . . . . sale or exchange”
between employers and the
pension plans they sponsor. At
the least, the contribution of
property in satisfaction of a
funding obligation is a type of
sale of the property. It is equally
surely a form of exchange, since
the property is exchanged for
diminution of the employer’s
207
funding obligation.
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The statutory text at issue—
providing that a transfer of
encumbered property “shall be
treated as” a sale or exchange—
supports the...view that Congress
intended Section 4975(f)(3) to
expand the scope of the prohibited
transaction provision. . . . Thus,
Section 4975(f)(3) amplifies and
extends the reach of “sale or
exchange” in Section 4975(c)(1)
(A) to include contributions of
encumbered property that do not
satisfy funding obligations. The
legislative history confirms that
Congress understood Section
4975(f)(3) to enlarge, rather than
restrict, the reach of the
prohibited transaction provision .
. . thus, Congress intended
Section 4975(f)(3) to provide
additional protection, not to limit
the protection provided by
211
Section 4975(c)(1)(A).

85

We feel that by this language
Congress intended § 4975(f)(3) to
expand, not limit, the scope of the
prohibited-transaction provision.
It extends the reach of “sale or
exchange” in § 4975(c)(1)(A) to
include
contributions
of
encumbered property that do not
satisfy funding obligations. See
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, p.
307 (1974). Congress intended by
§ 4975(f)(3) to provide additional
protection, not to limit the
protection already provided by §
212
4975(c)(1)(A).

The court of appeals interpreted
“sale or exchange” in Section
4975(c)(1)(A) contrary to its
ordinary, settled meaning . . . as a
result
of
its
erroneous
construction of Section 4975(f)(3).
That provision states . . . that “[a]
transfer [of] real or personal
property by a disqualified person

We do not agree with the Court
of Appeals’ conclusion that
§4975(f)(3) limits the meaning of
“sale or exchange,” as that phrase
appears
in
§4975(c)(1)(A).
Section 4975(f)(3) states that a
transfer of property “by a
disqualified person to a plan shall
be treated as a sale or exchange if

11/10/2016 09:41:10

211. Keystone Brief, supra note 207, at *23–*24.
212. Keystone, 508 U.S. at 161.
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Also as in Doe Agency, the Keystone Court adopts the SG’s
language to reject the rationale for the lower court’s decision:
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to a plan shall be treated as a sale
or exchange if the property is
subject to a mortgage or similar
lien.” The court of appeals . . .
read it as “implying that unless
[property] is encumbered by a
mortgage or lien, a transfer of
property is not to be treated as if
213
it were a sale or exchange.”

the property is subject to a
mortgage or similar lien.” The
Court of Appeals read this
language as implying that unless
property “is encumbered by a
mortgage or lien, a transfer of
property is not to be treated as if
it were a sale or exchange.” 951
214
F.2d at 78.

Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the Court in Posters N’
Things v. United States215 follows a similar form. The opinion
adopts an abundance of language from the SG’s brief regarding
Congressional intent, the Court’s precedent, and the opposing
parties’ arguments. The SG’s brief and the Court’s opinion look
at Congressional intent similarly:
Congress did not include among
the listed factors a defendant’s
statements about his intent or
other factors directly establishing
subjective intent. This omission is
significant in light of the fact that
the parallel list contained in the .
. . Model Drug Paraphernalia Act,
on which §857 was based,
includes among the relevant
factors “statements by an owner
. . . concerning [the object’s]
use” and “direct or circumstantial
evidence of the intent of an
owner . . . to deliver it to persons
whom he knows, or should
reasonably know, intend to use
the object to facilitate a violation
of this Act.” An objective
construction of the definitional

11/10/2016 09:41:10

213. Keystone Brief, supra note 207, at *21–*22 (brackets in original).
214. Keystone, 508 U.S. at 161.
215. 511 U.S. 513 (1994).
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Congress omitted a factor that
would have borne . . . directly on
the question of subjective intent
—the defendant’s own statements
about his intent. That omission is
particularly striking when Section
857 is compared to the Model
Drug Paraphernalia Act. The
Model Act includes among the
relevant factors “[s]tatements by
an owner . . . concerning [the]
use” of the object and “direct or
circumstantial evidence of the
intent of an owner . . . to deliver
it to persons whom he knows, or
should reasonably know, intend
to use the object to facilitate a
violation of this Act.” 8 App.,
infra, 6a-7a. Congress’s omission
of both factors in Section 857
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indicates that it did not intend to provision also finds support in
define drug paraphernalia in §857(f), which establishes an
terms of the subjective intent of exemption for items “traditionally
216
the defendant.
intended for use with tobacco
products.” An item’s “traditional”
use is not based on the subjective
217
intent of a particular defendant.
In 1988, Congress added the
word “traditionally” in place of
“primarily” . . . in order to
“clarif[y]” the meaning of the
exemption. Pub. L. 100-690, Tit.
VI, § 6485, 102 Stat. 4384.
Congress’ . . . merely “clarifying”
the law suggests that the original
phrase . . . was not a reference to
the
fundamentally
different
concept
of
a
defendant’s
219
subjective intent.

“[T]he failure of Congress
explicitly and unambiguously to
indicate whether mens rea is
required does not signal a
departure from this background
assumption of our criminal law.”
Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426.
Instead, “far more than the simple
omission of the appropriate
phrase from the statutory
definition is necessary to justify
dispensing with an intent
requirement.”
United
States

Neither our conclusion that
Congress intended an objective
construction of the “primarily
intended” language in §857(d),
nor the fact that Congress did not
include the word “knowingly” in
the text of §857, justifies the
conclusion
that
Congress
intended to dispense entirely with
a scienter requirement. This
Court stated in United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 438
U.S. 422, 438 . . . (1978):

11/10/2016 09:41:10

216. Brief for the United States at *17–*18, Posters N’ Things v. United States, 1993
WL 358181 (U.S. June 7, 1993) (No. 92-903) (brackets in original) [hereinafter Posters
Brief].
217. Posters, 511 U.S. at 520–21 (footnotes omitted).
218. Posters Brief, supra note 216, at *18–*19 (brackets in original).
219. Posters, 511 U.S. at 521 (brackets in original).
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In 1988, Congress replaced
“primarily” with “traditionally”
in order to “clarif[y]” the
meaning of the exemption. See
Pub. L. No. 100-690, Tit. IV, §
6485, 102 Stat. 4384. If Congress
had meant to shift from a
subjective to an objective concept
of intent, it is unlikely that it
would have characterized the
amendment as merely “clarifying”
218
the law.
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Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 438.
Despite this presumption, “courts
obviously must follow Congress’
intent as to the required level of
mental culpability for any
particular offense.” United States
v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 406
(1980). In this instance, however,
we do not believe that the
language or legislative history of
Section 857 demonstrates that
Congress intended to dispense
220
with a mens rea requirement.

“Certainly far more than the
simple
omission
of
the
appropriate phrase from the
statutory definition is necessary
to justify dispensing with an
221
intent requirement.”

The SG’s brief and the Posters opinion respond to the
arguments raised by petitioner in this way:
Petitioners argue that § 857 is
unconstitutionally
vague
as
applied to them in this case. . . .
Whatever its status as a general
matter, we cannot say that § 857
is unconstitutionally vague as
applied in this case. First, the list
of items in §857(d) constituting
per se drug paraphernalia
provides individuals and law
enforcement
officers
with
relatively clear guidelines as to
prohibited conduct. With respect
to the listed items, there can be
little doubt that the statute is
sufficiently determinate to meet
constitutional
requirements.
Many items involved in this
case—including bongs, roach
clips, and pipes designed for use

11/10/2016 09:41:10

220. Posters Brief, supra note 216, at *20–*21.
221. Posters, 511 U.S. at 522.
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Petitioners contend . . . that
Section 857 is unconstitutionally
vague as applied in this case. . . .
Whatever its standing in the
abstract, Section 857 is not
unconstitutionally
vague
as
applied to petitioners. The voidfor-vagueness doctrine “requires
that a penal statute define the
criminal offense with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people
can understand what conduct is
prohibited and in a manner that
does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory
enforcement.”
Kolender v. Lawson, 461. . . .
Many of the items at issue in this
case—including bongs, roach
clips, and pipes designed for use
with illegal drugs—are listed in
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Section 857(d). There is no with illegal drugs—are among the
plausible basis for arguing that items specifically listed in §
223
the statute is unconstitutionally 857(d).
222
vague concerning those items.
Petitioner
Acty’s
other
contentions are not properly
before the Court. First, she argues
that
she
was
improperly
convicted of aiding and abetting
the manufacture and distribution
of cocaine because the jury
instructions
created
a
“presumption” that certain items
of drug paraphernalia “were
intended for manufacturing with a
controlled substance.” . . . This
argument was neither raised in
nor addressed by the Court of
225
Appeals.

In another section of the Posters opinion, the Court
establishes the SG’s interpretation of “primarily intended” as the
governing definition of that statutory phrase:
Finally,
our
objective Finally, an objective construction
construction of the “primarily of
the
phrase
“primarily
intended for use” language avoids intended” is consistent with the
Posters Brief, supra note 216, at *30–*32.
Posters, 511 U.S. at 525–26.
Posters Brief, supra note 216, at *34.
Posters, 511 U.S. at 527.
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Petitioner Acty contends . . . that
she was improperly convicted of
aiding
and
abetting
the
manufacture and distribution of
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
841(a)(1). . . . She asserts . . . that
. . . under the district court’s
instructions
the
jury
was
“required . . . to find that the
substances were intended for
manufacturing with a controlled
substance.” Petitioner argues that
the district court’s instructions
. . . “create[d] ‘a presumption that
relieve[d] the [government] of its
burden of persuasion on an
element of the offense,’” in
violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. .
. . Petitioner did not raise that
argument in the court of appeals,
and that court did not address
224
it.
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the creation of an unusual mens
rea standard and is consistent
with the meaning of similar
language in other federal criminal
statutes.
See
18
U.S.C.
921(a)(17)(B) (“armor piercing
ammunition”
excludes
any
projectile that the Secretary of the
Treasury finds is “primarily
intended” to be used for sporting
purposes); 21 U.S.C. 860(d)(2)
(“youth
center”
means
a
recreational facility “intended
primarily for use by persons
226
under 18 years of age”).

natural reading of similar
language
in
definitional
provisions of other federal
criminal statutes. See 18 U.S.C. §
921(a)(17)(B) (“armor piercing
ammunition”
excludes
any
projectile that is “primarily
intended” to be used for sporting
purposes, as found by the
Secretary of the Treasury); 21
U.S.C. §860(d)(2) (1988 ed.,
Supp. V) (“youth center” means a
recreational facility “intended
primarily for use by persons
227
under 18 years of age”).

2. Non-Blackmun Cases

11/10/2016 09:41:10

226. Posters Brief, supra note 216, at *19.
227. Posters, 511 U.S. at 521.
228. 350 U.S. 247 (1956).
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Justice Blackmun’s Lifted opinions for the Court present
some of the most elaborate examples of opinions that adopt
language from the briefs in all their facets, including legal
reasoning. They also represent the majority of Lifted opinions.
Other Lifted opinions show greater variation in the material they
include from the briefs, but they all tend to take the focal brief as
the template for the language in the opinion. Many of these, like
the Blackmun opinions, rely on the SG’s briefs from beginning
to end.
The earliest Lifted relationship in the dataset comes from
the 1955 opinion in Steiner v. Mitchell,228 authored by Chief
Justice Warren. This case is atypical both because the legalreasoning section of the opinion is quite small compared to the
discussion of facts and because the amount of overlapping
language in the facts section is higher than in any other Lifted
opinion and source brief at seventy-one percent. The Court’s
reliance on the SG’s brief is apparent at the outset when the
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question posed in the opinion is compared to the question in
each brief:229
Under the provisions of
the Fair Labor Standards
Act, as amended by the
Portal-to-Portal Act, does
time spent by petitioner’s
employees at its battery
manufacturing plant in
changing from street
clothes into work clothes
prior to punching the time
clock at the beginning of
the work day, and in
taking shower baths and
changing
from
work
clothes to street clothes
after punching out the
time clock at the end of
the work day, constitute
compensable
“time
worked”
under
the
230
amended Act?

Where workers in a
battery plant must make
extensive
use
of
dangerously caustic and
toxic materials and are
compelled
by
circumstances, including
vital considerations of
health and hygiene, to
change clothes and . . . to
shower
in
facilities
which State law requires
their
employer
to
provide,
are
these
“principal,” rather than
“preliminary”
or
“postliminary,” activities
within the meaning of
the
Portal-to-Portal
231
Act.

The opinion in Steiner follows the facts as described in the
SG’s brief and deviates considerably from the facts as conveyed

11/10/2016 09:41:10

229. In all three-column Steiner quotations, the petitioner’s brief, which is not highly
similar to the opinion, is in the left column. The highly similar SG’s brief is in the center
column, and the opinion is in the right column.
230. Brief for Petitioners at *2–*3 Steiner v. Mitchell, 1955 WL 72535 (U.S. Aug. 12,
1955) (No. 22) [hereinafter Steiner Petitioners’ Brief].
231. Brief for Respondent at *2 Steiner v. Mitchell, 1955 WL 72536 (U.S. Sept. 26,
1955) (No. 22) [hereinafter Steiner Respondent’s Brief.].
232. Steiner, 350 U.S. at 248.
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The precise question is
whether workers in a
battery plant must be paid
as a part of their “principal”
activities for the time
incident
to
changing
clothes at the beginning of
the shift and showering at
the end, where they must
make extensive use of
dangerously caustic and
toxic materials, and are
compelled
by
circumstances, including
vital considerations of
health and hygiene, to
change clothes and to
shower in facilities which
state law requires their
employer to provide, or
whether these activities
are
“preliminary”
or
“postliminary” within the
meaning of the Portal-to232
Portal Act.
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by the petitioner.233 The facts are often also drawn from the
record, but as part of the opinion, they are damaging to the
petitioner’s contention that the working conditions in the battery
plant are not hazardous and do not require the workers to take
additional precautions to maintain their safety. The following
examples exemplify how the pictures painted by the SG and the
Court are quite different from that drawn by the petitioner.
The
manufacturing
process
for
storage
batteries involves the
handling of toxic matter,
such as sulphuric acid
and lead oxide. This
matter damages clothes
if it is spilled on
234
them.

All of the production
employees, such as those
with whom we are here
concerned, customarily
work with or near the
various chemicals used
in the plant. These
include lead metal, lead
oxide, lead sulphate, lead
peroxide, and sulphuric
acid. Some of these are
in liquid form; some are
in powder form, and
some are solid. In the
manufacturing process,
some of the materials go
through various changes
and give off dangerous
fumes. Some are spilled
or dropped, and thus
become a part of the dust
in the air. In general, the
chemicals permeate the
entire
plant
and
everything and everyone
in it. . . . Abnormal
concentrations of lead
were discovered in the

11/10/2016 09:41:10

233. It is worth noting that the opinion also derives from the lower court opinion, but the
shared language is mainly between the opinion and the SG’s brief, and not between the
lower court’s opinion and the Supreme Court’s opinion.
234. Steiner Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 230, at *4.
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All of the . . . production
employees customarily
work with or near the
various chemicals used
in the plant . . . . These
include lead metal, lead
oxide, lead sulphate, lead
peroxide, and sulphuric
acid . . . . Some of these
are in liquid form, some
are in powder form, and
some are solid . . . . In
the
manufacturing
process some of the
materials go through
various changes . . . . and
give
off
dangerous
fumes . . . . Some are
spilled or dropped and
thus become a part of the
dust in the air . . . . In
general, the chemicals
permeate the entire plant
and
everything
and
everyone in it. . . .
Moreover,
“abnormal
concentrations of lead
have been discovered in
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the bodies of some of
[petitioners’] employees
and
[petitioners’]
insurance doctor has
recommended that such
employees be segregated
from their customary
235
duties”. . . .

93

bodies of some of
petitioners’ employees,
and
petitioners’
insurance
doctor
recommended that such
employees be segregated
from their customary
236
duties.

In another instance the Steiner opinion directly adopts the
SG’s reasoning concerning the petitioner’s treatment of its
workers:
Petitioners do not record or pay
for the time which their
employees spend in these
activities, which was found to
amount to thirty minutes a day,
ten minutes in the morning and
twenty
minutes
in
the
afternoon, for each employee.
They do not challenge the
concurrent findings of the
courts below that the clotheschanging
and
showering
activities of the employees are
indispensable
to
the
performance of their productive
work and integrally related
238
thereto.

While the opinion in Steiner is unusually fact-intensive,
most Lifted opinions, as is suggested by the Blackmun

Steiner Respondent’s Brief, supra note 231, at *3, *4 (citations omitted).
Steiner, 350 U.S. at 249–50.
Steiner Respondent’s Brief, supra note 231, at *7, *8.
Steiner, 350 U.S. at 251.
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Petitioners concededly do not
record or pay for the time which
their employees spend in clothes
changing and showering, which
was found to amount to thirty
minutes a day (ten minutes in the
morning and twenty minutes in
the afternoon) for each employee
(R. 221). . . . Petitioners do not
challenge the concurrent finding
of the courts below that the
clothes-changing and showering
activities of the battery plant
employees (men who work with
or near dangerously toxic
materials) are indispensable to
the performance of productive
work and integrally related
237
thereto. See Pet. Br., p. 33.
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examples,239 include an even mix of lifted facts and lifted
reasoning. Justice Goldberg’s opinion for the Court in Tilton v.
Missouri Pacific Railroad 240 is more typical of the Lifted type.
Its language parallels the reasoning found in the SG’s brief as
well as the SG’s construction of the facts. The certainty present
in the petitioner’s argument makes its way into the Court’s
opinion, as is apparent in the following:
There is no room for doubt in this
case that . . . had petitioners
remained continuously on the job
during the period of their military
service,
they
would
have
completed the work period and
qualified as journeymen in
advance of those who passed
them in seniority during their
absence. Each petitioner was
entitled,
under
the
labor
agreement, to do carman’s work
ahead of any upgraded after him.
It was only because of
petitioners’ military service that
men upgraded after them were
able to work more days as
provisional carmen and to qualify
as journeymen before them. But
for their absence, petitioners
would
have
qualified
as
journeymen carmen and achieved
the seniority dates they now
242
claim.

Shared phrases such as “there is no room for doubt”
indicate the parallel strength and confidence of the arguments in

11/10/2016 09:41:10

239. See Section III(F)(1), supra.
240. 376 U.S. 169 (1964).
241. Brief for Petitioners at *25–*26 Tilton v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 1963 WL
105912 (U.S. Aug. 21, 1963) (No. 49) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Tilton Brief].
242. Tilton, 376 U.S. at 177.
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There is no room for doubt then,
that, had Tilton, Beck and
McClearn remained continuously
on the job, they would have been
able to complete the work period
and qualify as journeymen in
advance of those who “jumped”
them in seniority during their
absence. Each was entitled, under
the agreement, to do carman’s
work ahead of any man upgraded
after him. It was only because of
petitioners’ military service that
men upgraded after them were
able to work more days as carmen
and to qualify as journeymen
before them (Tilt. R. Stip. 29).
But for their absence, petitioners
would
have
qualified
as
journeymen carmen and achieved
the seniority dates they now
241
claim.
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the SG’s brief and the statements in the Court’s opinion. In other
examples, the opinion continues to validate the SG’s reasoning
as it takes contentions made in the brief as its own wording. As
in Steiner, these statements in the opinion make the Tilton
Court’s position on the issues, and in particular its agreement
with the SG’s logic, abundantly clear:
It was apparent that McKinney,
when he left for service, could not
have predicted with absolute
certainty that a group position
would fall vacant in his absence;
that he would be in adequate
health to bid for it; that he would
elect to bid for it; and that he
would not have lost his lower
position because of unsatisfactory
performance. . . . [A] returning
veteran cannot claim a promotion
that
depends
solely
upon
satisfactory completion of a
prerequisite
period
of
employment training unless he
first works that period. But upon
satisfactorily completing that
period, as petitioners did here, he
can insist upon a seniority date
reflecting the delay caused by
244
military service.

These samples of parallel construction in the SG’s brief and
in the opinion in Tilton are similar to those in Steiner, depicting
language that leaves little doubt regarding the position of the

11/10/2016 09:41:10

243. Tilton Brief, supra note 241, at *22 (discussing McKinney v. Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R.
Co., 357 U.S. 265 (1958)), *34.
244. Tilton, 376 U.S. at 177 (discussing McKinney v. Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R. Co., 357 U.S.
265 (1958)), 181.
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For it was apparent that
McKinney could never have
predicted “with any degree of
certainty,” when he left for
service, that (1) a group 1
position would fall vacant in his
absence; (2) that he would elect
to bid for it; (3) that he would be
in adequate health to bid for it;
and (4) that he would not have
already lost his lower position
because
of
unsatisfactory
performance. . . . A returning
veteran cannot claim a promotion
that
depends
solely
upon
completing a prerequisite period
of employment training unless he
first works that period but, upon
completion of that period of
training, he can insist upon a
seniority date in the higher
position which reflects the delay
in completing the requisite period
of training caused by military
243
service.
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litigant or of the Court. They also show that the Tilton Court
adopted the SG’s reasoning when ruling in the government’s
favor.
Chief Justice Warren’s second Lifted opinion for the Court,
Foti v. INS,245 adopts more reasoning similar to that in the SG’s
brief even than appeared in Steiner. In particular, the Foti
Court’s reasoning is similar in construing the relevant legislative
language and the practice of how to enforce it.
Thus,
the
administrative
discretion to grant a suspension
of deportation has historically
been consistently exercised as an
integral part of the proceedings
which have led to the issuance of
247
a final deportation order.

The fundamental purpose of
Section 106(a), its legislative
history
discloses,
was
to
abbreviate the process of judicial
review of deportation orders in
order
to
frustrate
certain
practices, which had come to
Congress’s attention, whereby
persons subject to deportation
were forestalling enforcement by
248
dilatory tactics in the courts.

The fundamental purpose behind
§ 106(a) was to abbreviate the
process of judicial review of
deportation orders in order to
frustrate certain practices which
had come to the attention of
Congress,
whereby
persons
subject to deportation were
forestalling departure by dilatory
249
tactics in the courts.

The last-mentioned consideration
also refutes the majority’s
suggestion that it is “incredible”
that Congress meant to burden
courts of appeals with review of

And the suggestion of the court
below that it is “incredible” that
Congress meant to burden the
Courts of Appeals with review of
all orders denying discretionary

11/10/2016 09:41:10

245. 375 U.S. 217 (1963).
246. Brief for Respondent at *19, Foti v. INS, 1963 WL 105680 (U.S. July 31, 1963)
(No. 28) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Foti Brief].
247. Foti, 375 U.S. at 223.
248. Foti Brief, supra note 246, at *24.
249. Foti, 375 U.S. at 224.
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the
beginning,
by
regulations having the force and
effect of law, it has been
exercised as an integral part of
the administrative proceedings
which have led to the issuance of
246
a final deportation order.
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orders
denying
250
departure.
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voluntary relief in deportation cases is
251
unconvincing.

Like the Foti and Tilton opinions, Justice Marshall’s
opinion for the Court in Hodel v. Indiana252 follows the
language and reasoning of the SG’s brief. Significant to this case
are the instances in which the opinion and the brief both discuss
the importance of giving deference to Congressional choices:
“This court will certainly not
substitute its judgment for that of
Congress unless the relation of
the subject to interstate commerce
and its effect upon it are clearly
254
non-existent.”

All of the provisions invalidated
by the district court are
reasonably calculated to further
the legitimate congressional goals
of preserving the productive
capacity
of
mined
lands,
minimizing
the
adverse
environmental consequences that
can result from surface mining or
inadequate reclamation of mined
lands, and protecting the public
from health and safety hazards
that may be created by surface
255
mining.

All the provisions invalidated by
the court below are reasonably
calculated to further these
legitimate goals. For example,
the approximate-original-contour
requirement in §515(b)(5) is
designed
to
avoid
the
environmental and other harm
that may result from unreclaimed
or improperly restored mining
256
cuts.

11/10/2016 09:41:10

250. Foti Brief, supra note 246, at *12.
251. Foti, 375 U.S. at 230.
252. 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
253. Brief for Appellant at *26, Hodel v. Indiana, 1980 WL 339846 (U.S. Nov. 29,
1980) (No. 80-231) [hereinafter Hodel Brief].
254. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 326 (quoting Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 521 (1922)).
255. Hodel Brief, supra note 253, at *17.
256. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 327 (footnotes omitted).
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A court may not substitute its
judgment for that of Congress
merely because it believes that
Congress was “unwise in not
choosing a means more precisely
253
related to its primary purpose.”
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Congress acted rationally in
drawing these distinctions, and
the fact that a particular State has
more of one kind of mining operation than another does not establish impermissible discrimination
under the Fifth Amendment’s
258
Due Process Clause.

Moreover,
Congress’
determination
that
federal
intervention is necessary in this
area was based in part on a desire
to ensure that mine operators in
states
adhering
to
high
performance and reclamation
standards
would
not
be
disadvantaged in competition
with their counterparts in states
with less rigorous regulatory
programs. See 30 U.S.C. (Supp.
I)
1201(g).
The
statutory
provisions overturned by the
district court advance these
legitimate goals of Congress and
thus are rationally related to the
protection of commerce from the
adverse impact of surface mining
259
operations.

[T]he
Act
reflects
the
congressional goal of protecting
mine operators in States adhering
to
high
performance
and
reclamation
standards
from
disadvantageous competition with
operators in States with less
rigorous regulatory programs. See
30 U. S. C. §1201 (g) (1976 ed.,
Supp.
III).
The
statutory
provisions invalidated by the
District Court advance these
legitimate goals, and we conclude
that Congress acted reasonably in
adopting the regulatory scheme
260
contained in the Act.

As is the case with several other Lifted opinions, the
opinion in Hodel uses the SG’s reasoning for rejecting the
opposing parties’ arguments:

Hodel Brief, supra note 253, at *28 (footnote omitted).
Hodel, 452 U.S. at 333.
Hodel Brief, supra note 253, at *20.
Hodel, 452 U.S. at 329 (footnote omitted).
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That is surely a rational
distinction for Congress to draw,
and the fact that a particular state
has more of one kind of mining
operation than another does not
establish
discrimination
in
violation of the Due Process
Clause
of
the
Fifth
257
Amendment.

38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 54 Side A

11/10/2016 09:41:10

FELDMANRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE)

11/7/2016 12:38 PM

BORROWED LANGUAGE IN SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

99

More important, even were
appellees correct that the
challenged provisions impose a
greater burden on mine operators
in the Midwest, that is no basis
for finding the provisions
unconstitutional. A claim of
arbitrariness cannot rest solely on
a statute’s lack of uniform
geographic impact. Secretary of
Agriculture v. Central Roig
Refining Co., 338 U.S. 604, 616262
619 . . . (1950).

As in Virginia Surface Mining,
plaintiffs’ taking claims did not
focus on any particular properties
to
which
the
challenged
provisions have been applied, and
the district court did not base its
ruling on the denial of a surface
mining permit for specific prime
farmland operations proposed by
263
plaintiffs.

In this case as in Virginia Surface
Mining, appellees’ takings claims
do not focus on any particular
properties
to
which
the
challenged provisions have been
applied. Similarly, the District
Court’s ruling did not pertain to
the taking of a particular piece of
property or the denial of a mining
permit for specific prime
farmland operations proposed by
264
appellees.

[P]laintiffs here, like their
counterparts in Virginia Surface
Mining, have made no showing
that they were ever assessed civil
penalties . . ., much less that the
statutory prepayment requirement
was ever applied to them or that it
265
caused them injury.

[L]ike their counterparts in
Virginia
Surface
Mining,
appellees have made no showing
that they were ever assessed civil
penalties . . ., much less that the
statutory prepayment requirement
was ever applied to them or
266
caused them any injury.

Hodel Brief, supra note 253, at *27.
Hodel, 452 U.S. at 332.
Hodel Brief, supra note 253, at *30.
Hodel, 452 U.S. at 334 (footnote omitted).
Hodel Brief, supra note 253, at* 36.
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Moreover,
even
assuming
arguendo that the provisions in
question impose a greater burden
on mine operators in midwestern
states, that is no basis for striking
them down as unconstitutional. A
claim
of
arbitrariness
or
irrationality cannot be founded
merely upon a statute’s lack of
261
uniform geographic impact.
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The links between the opinion and the SG’s brief in
Hodel—from the interpretation of Congressional purpose in
enacting a particular statute through the rejection of the
opposing parties’ arguments—are also present in Justice
Stewart’s opinion for the Court in Lehman v. Nakshian.267 In
reviewing the purpose behind the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, the Lehman Court shares the SG’s views:
When Congress has waived the
sovereign immunity of the United
States, it has almost always
conditioned that waiver upon a
plaintiff’s relinquishing any claim
269
to a jury trial.

In any event, Rule 38(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that the right to trial by
jury “as declared by the Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution
or as given by a statute of the
United States shall be preserved
to the parties inviolate” (emphasis
added). This language certainly
does not state a general rule that
jury trials are to be presumed
whenever Congress provides for
cases to be brought in the district

Moreover, Rule 38(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that the right to a jury
trial “as declared by the Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution
or as given by a statute of the
United States shall be preserved
to the parties inviolate” (emphasis
added). This language hardly
states a general rule that jury
trials are to be presumed
whenever Congress provides for
cases to be brought in federal

11/10/2016 09:41:10

266. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 335–36.
267. 453 U.S. 156 (1981).
268. Brief for Petitioner at 11, Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156 (Jan. 1981) (No. 80242) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter Lehman Brief].
269. Lehman, 453 U.S. at 161.
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The general experience has been
that when Congress waives the
sovereign immunity of the United
States, it does not provide for trial
by jury. . . . [J]ury trials
historically have not been
available in the Court of Claims
in the broad range of cases within
its jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491—i.e., all claims against
the United States “founded either
upon the Constitution, or any Act
268
of Congress.”
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court. To the contrary, Rule 38(a)
renders it necessary to look
elsewhere
for
a
specific,
affirmative grant of the right
where, as here, the Seventh
270
Amendment does not apply.

district courts. Indeed, Rule 38(a)
requires an affirmative statutory
grant of the right where, as in this
case, the Seventh Amendment
271
does not apply.

As is evident, neither the
provision for cases under Section
15(c) to be brought in district
court nor the use of the word
“legal” in that section can be
thought
to
manifest
a
congressional intent that the
plaintiff in an ADEA action
against the federal government
272
have a right to trial by jury.

Neither the provision for federal
employer cases to be brought in
district courts rather than the
Court of Claims, nor the use of
the word “legal” in that section,
evinces a congressional intent
that ADEA plaintiffs who
proceed to trial against the
Federal Government may do so
273
before a jury.

In its analysis of whether jury trials should be allowed in
cases like Lehman, the Court follows the SG’s reasoning
regarding the dearth of evidence presented by the respondent:

Lehman Brief, supra note 268, at 31.
Lehman, 453 U.S. at 164–65 (footnote omitted).
Lehman Brief, supra note 268, at 40–41.
Lehman, 453 U.S. at 168.
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270.
271.
272.
273.

The respondent cannot point to a
single reference in the legislative
history to the subject of jury trials
in cases brought against the
Federal Government. There is
none. And there is nothing to
indicate that Congress did not
mean what it plainly indicated
when it expressly provided for
jury trials in § 7(c) cases but not
in § 15(c) cases. In fact, the few
inferences that may be drawn
from the legislative history are
inconsistent with the respondent’s
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There is nothing in the legislative
history to indicate that Congress
did not mean what it said in
providing for jury trials in cases
under Section 7(c) but not in
cases
against
the
federal
government under Section 15(c).
Indeed, the legislative history
contains not a single reference to
the issue of jury trials in federal
sector cases, and any inferences
that may be drawn from the
legislative history on this
question
cut
against
the
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availability of jury trials. . . . position.
[A]ny inferences that may be
drawn from the legislative history
cut strongly against respondent’s
274
position.

Writing for the Court in Carter v. Kentucky,276 another case
dealing with defendants’ rights, Justice Stewart utilized the
petitioner’s constitutional analysis—advanced by a team of
public advocates employed by the Commonwealth of
Kentucky—for requiring specific jury instructions under the
Fifth Amendment:
Without question, the Fifth
Amendment privilege and the
presumption of innocence are
closely aligned. But these
principles
serve
different
functions, and we cannot say that
the jury would not have derived
“significant additional guidance,”
Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478,
484 . . . , from the instruction
278
requested.

This passage demonstrates that the Carter opinion shares the
strength of the argument made by petitioner’s counsel with
phrases like “no doubt” in the petitioner’s brief and “[w]ithout
question” in the opinion that leave little room for alternative
interpretations of the Constitution’s language.
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274. Lehman Brief, supra note 268, at 5–6, 17.
275. Lehman, 453 U.S. at 166.
276. 450 U.S. 288 (1981).
277. Brief for Petitioner at *39–*40, Carter v. Kentucky, 1980 WL 339742 (1981) (No.
80-5060).
278. Carter, 450 U.S. at 304.
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There is no doubt that the Fifth
Amendment
privilege,
the
presumption of innocence, and
the burden of proof are closely
aligned. . . . However, to say that
these principles are closely
aligned is not to say that they do
not serve distinctive functions.
Petitioner’s jury would have
certainly derived “significant
additional guidance” from an
instruction that “no inference”
should be drawn from his failure
to testify. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436
277
U.S. at 484.
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Chief Justice Burger’s opinion for the Court in United
States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms 279 has a similar tone of
certainty in its adoption of language from the SG’s brief,
especially in the Court’s statutory analysis regarding whether
Congress intended for the possibility of forfeiture proceedings
after a gun owner is acquitted of criminal charges:
Applying the first prong of the
Ward test to the facts of the
instant case, we conclude that
Congress designed forfeiture
under § 924(d) as a remedial civil
sanction. Congress’ intent in this
regard
is
most
clearly
demonstrated by the procedural
mechanisms it established for
enforcing forfeitures under the
statute. Section 924(d) does not
prescribe the steps to be followed
in effectuating a forfeiture, but
rather incorporates by reference
the procedures of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 (Code),
26 U. S. C. § 7321–7328. The
Code in turn provides that an
action to enforce a forfeiture
“shall be in the nature of a
proceeding in rem in the United
States District Court for the
district where such seizure is
made.” 26 U. S. C. §7323. In
contrast to the in personam nature
of criminal actions, actions in rem
have traditionally been viewed as
civil
proceedings,
with
jurisdiction
dependent
upon
seizure of a physical object. See

11/10/2016 09:41:10

279. 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
280. Brief for Petitioner at 21, United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S.
354 (June 1983) (No. 82-1047) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter 89 Firearms Brief].
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Congress’ intent that Section
924(d) be regarded as a civil
rather than a criminal penalty is
most clearly evidenced, however,
by the procedural mechanisms it
established
for
enforcing
forfeitures under the statute.
Section 924(d) does not prescribe
the steps to be followed in
effectuating a forfeiture, but
rather incorporates by reference
the procedures of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954. The
Internal Revenue Code provides
that proceedings to enforce
forfeitures “shall be in the nature
of a proceeding in rem in the
United States District Court for
the district where such seizure is
made” (26 U.S.C. 7323). As
outlined above, in rem actions
are, by their very nature, civil
proceedings, with jurisdiction
dependent upon seizure of a
physical object, in contrast with
the in personam nature of
criminal actions. See Calero280
Toledo, 416 U.S. at 684.
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Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 684
281
. . . (1974).
In addition to establishing the in
rem nature of the action, the Code
authorizes
a
summary
administrative proceeding for
forfeiture of items valued at
$2,500 or less. . . . See 26 U.S.C.
§7325.
By
creating
such
distinctly civil procedures for
forfeitures
under
§924(d),
Congress has “indicate[d] clearly
that it intended a civil, not a
criminal, sanction.” Helvering v.
Mitchell, supra, 303 U.S., at
283
402.

When Congress enacted the 1968
gun control legislation, “it was
concerned with the widespread
traffic in firearms and with their
general availability to those
whose possession thereof was
contrary to the public interest.”
Huddleston v. United States, 415
U.S. 814, 824 (1974). . . . The
Gun Control Act of 1968, in
particular, was designed to
“control the indiscriminate flow”
of firearms across state borders
and to “assist and encourage
States and local communities to
adopt and enforce stricter gun
control laws.” H.R. Rep. No.
1577, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 8

In enacting the 1968 gun control
legislation,
Congress
“was
concerned with the widespread
traffic in firearms and with their
general availability to those
whose possession thereof was
contrary to the public interest.”
Huddleston v. United States, 415
U.S. 814, 824 . . . (1974).
Accordingly, Congress sought to
“control the indiscriminate flow”
of firearms and to “assist and
encourage States and local
communities to adopt and enforce
stricter gun control laws.” H. R.
Rep. No. 1577, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess., 8 (1968). Section 924(d)
plays an important role in

11/10/2016 09:41:10

281. 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 363.
282. 89 Firearms Brief, supra note 280, at 21–22.
283. 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 363.
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In addition to the in rem nature of
the action, the Internal Revenue
Code provides a summary,
administrative proceeding for
forfeiture of seized goods valued
at $2,500 or less. See 26 U.S.C.
7325. . . That Congress provided
a distinctly civil procedure for
[forfeitures under 18 U.S.C. 924
[36] (d)] indicates clearly that it
intended a civil, not a criminal,
sanction.” Helvering, 303 U.S. at
282
402.
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(1968). . . . Section 924(d) plays
an important role in furthering the
“broad prophylactic purpose” of
the 1968 gun control legislation
(Dickerson v. New Banner
Institute, supra, slip op. 15) by
eliminating stocks of firearms
that have been used or intended
for use outside regulated channels
284
of commerce.

105

furthering
the
prophylactic
purposes of the 1968 gun control
legislation
by
discouraging
unregulated
commerce
in
firearms and by removing from
circulation firearms that have
been used or intended for use
outside regulated channels of
285
commerce.

By sharing the SG’s reasoning in 89 Firearms, the Court
shows its regard for the SG’s interpretation of Congressional
intent and purpose to such a degree that it is willing to
incorporate many aspects of the SG’s argument wholesale into
the opinion. This, however, is not an anomaly in this sort of
case. Lifted opinions, almost without exception, convey the
strength of the Court’s faith in the SG’s approach.286 On a
separate level, though, it also shows great deference on the part
of the Court to the SG’s contentions. The SG has insight into the
inner workings of the government not available to other parties,
but even an insider with special knowledge can be fallible.
Unfortunately, comparisons of briefs and opinions cannot
provide evidence of the Court’s level of scrutiny into the SG’s
contentions.

These examples present a slice of the relationship between
Supreme Court briefs and opinions. They highlight cases in
which the Court has borrowed a large amount of substantive
language from merits briefs. While there has been prior
scholarship demonstrating that Supreme Court opinions borrow

11/10/2016 09:41:10

284. 89 Firearms Brief, supra note 280, at 24–25.
285. 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 364.
286. One exception would be Carter. See text accompanying note 276, supra (noting
that lifted language in Carter came from a brief filed by a team of lawyers working for
Kentucky’s Department of Public Advocacy).
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IV. CONCLUSION: MAKING SENSE OF THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN MERITS BRIEFS AND SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
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287. See, e.g., Corley, supra note 22 (discussing the influence of merits briefs on the
language of Supreme Court opinions).
288. For discussion of repeat players’ success in the Supreme Court see, for example,
Joseph W. Swanson, Experience Matters: The Rise of a Supreme Court Bar and Its Effect
on Certiorari, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 175 (2007); Kevin T. McGuire, Explaining
Executive Success in the U. S. Supreme Court, 51 POLITICAL RESEARCH Q. 505 (1998),
and Kevin T. McGuire, Repeat Players in the Supreme Court: The Role of Experienced
Lawyers in Litigation Success, 57 J. POLITICS 187 (1995). For a more detailed look at the
Solicitor General’s unique impact on Supreme Court opinion language, see Black and
Owens, supra note 22, and Patricia A. Millett, “We’re Your Government and We’re Here
to Help”: Obtaining Amicus Support from the Federal Government in Supreme Court
Cases, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 209 (2009), the latter noting that, “once requested by
the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General’s analysis of the importance of a question
presented and the necessity and appropriateness of certiorari review carry significant
weight with the Court.” Millett, supra this note, at 215–16 (footnote omitted).
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language from briefs,287 the extent of this borrowing at the
individual-case level is uncharted territory. The cases discussed
here illuminate important factors regarding the relationship
between briefs and opinions in cases that include high levels of
overlapping language. Yet these comparisons between briefs and
opinions leave us with unanswered questions.
The comparisons drawn from these cases provide further
confirmation that repeat players—the OSG in particular—have
strong relationships with the Court that makes this extent of
language sharing possible.288 They also help differentiate the
types of impact a brief can have on an opinion. There are clear
differences between cases in which the opinions share citations
and quoted language with the briefs, and cases in which
opinions share language that was original with the briefs. The
former cases present examples of briefs that were likely
influential to the extent that they focused the Court’s attention
on particular precedent, on specific places in the record, and on
relevant statutes, all intended to assist the Court in its decision
making. But the latter—the Lifted relationships that are the
focus of this article—present puzzles due not only to the extent
of the language shared, but also due to the content of the shared
language.
How deeply should we read into the borrowed language in
Lifted opinions? If we dig into other cases and probe the
relationships between briefs and opinions, there are almost
assuredly more examples of this type of language sharing,
potentially at levels that approximate those in the cases covered
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in this article. There are likely even more cases in which minor
editing changed the phrasing so that language does not align
perfectly between brief and opinion, but in which high levels of
shared language predominate.
A few of the implications from relationships predicated on
language lifting bear consideration. That Supreme Court
opinions share language with briefs itself is not an original
concept. There are also many sources that the Justices or their
clerks would have located without the assistance of briefs, so in
some cases it is mere happenstance that the language is shared.
Judges also often want briefs to organize and synthesize the
information in case records and information relevant to judicial
decision of the issues raised in them,289 so they may actively
seek specific language in the briefs before them.
The unattributed shared language, however, is not so
readily explained by well-organized and persuasive briefs.
Opinions can and do cite to briefs, just as they cite other sources
of law, analysis, and information. In Russello for instance, the
opinion cites to the petitioner’s brief when it says that
Petitioner himself has not attempted to define the term
“interest” as used in § 1963(a)(1). He insists, however, that
the term does not reach money or profits because, he says:
‘Interest,’ by definition, includes of necessity an interest in
290
something.’ Brief for Petitioner 9.”

Similarly in National Bank of Commerce, the Court cites to the
respondent’s brief, stating that

These examples show that even in Lifted opinions, the Court is
willing to cite to the briefs in circumstances in which the brief
informs the opinion writer’s choice of language.

11/10/2016 09:41:10

289. See Rehnquist, supra note 17; Tate, supra note 17.
290. Russello, 464 U.S. at 22 (1983).
291. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 725.

38435-aap_17-1 Sheet No. 58 Side A

[c]ommon sense dictates that a right to withdraw qualifies
as a right to property for purposes of §§ 6331 and 6332. In
a levy proceeding, the IRS “‘steps into the taxpayer’s
shoes,’” United States v. Rodgers, 461 U. S., at 691, n. 16,
. . . quoting 4 Bittker, ¶ 111.5.4, at 111-102; M. Saltzman,
IRS Practice and Procedure ¶ 14.08, p. 14-32 (1981); Brief
291
for Respondent 8.
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In the bulk of the Lifted relationships identified in this
article, however, the Court does not cite sources for its choices
of language. Yet the extent of shared language in these cases,
and the Justices’ and clerks’ access to the briefs, make the likely
source of the language clear.292 This lack of attribution raises
two concerns. The first has to do with the trustworthiness or
credibility of the source: How are we to know that the shared
language in the opinion was lifted from a brief written by a
reputable source? The second has to do with the normative value
that we place on courts’ citing to the sources they use: When
there is a clear indication that the language lifted into the
opinion did not originate with either the Justice writing for the
Court or an obvious third-party source (a constitutional
provision, a statute, a regulation, or an official comment, for
instance, or perhaps a law-review article known in the relevant
field), shouldn’t we expect the Justice writing for the Court to
make that clear?
The trustworthiness quandary may be diminished because
of the source of language in these cases. The relationship
between the SG and the Court is predicated on trust.293 This is
evident from the numerous times the Court has invited the SG to
file amicus briefs in cases in which the government is not a
party.294 This trust and the reasons behind it might allay
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292. Since clerks are involved in the process of drafting opinions it is plausible that
these choices of shared language stem from clerks’ decisions. To this point, in an interview
Justice Ginsburg related the clerks’ role in opinion drafting when she said, “I would like to
do all of my own work so I could write all my opinions myself, but there is just not enough
time to do that.” Todd C. Peppers, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Her Law Clerks, in Peppers &
Ward, supra note 2, at 397. It is also the case that even if the shared language in some of
these instances stems from a source that both the brief and the opinion share, the lack of
attribution does not change.
293. See, e.g., REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF
LAW 161 (1992) (noting in discussion of a related topic that “solicitors general must
consider the trust they enjoy with the Court”); cf. Michael A. Bailey, Brian Kamoie &
Forrest Maltzman, Signals from the Tenth Justice: The Political Role of the Solicitor
General in Supreme Court Decision Making, 49 AM. J. POLITICAL SCI. 72, 83 (2005)
(noting, after examining relationship between SG and Court, SG’s “direct impact” on
“decisions reached by the Court” and “influence” on “all justices,” and acknowledging
SG’s “success rates”).
294. See, e.g., Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy,
72 YALE L.J. 694, 717 (1963) (describing the Court’s seeking the expertise of the SG and
others by inviting them to file amicus briefs); see also Millett, supra note 288, at 225
(noting that the SG filed more amicus briefs—thirty—than merits briefs—twenty-seven—
in the 2007 term).
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295. The question of the source of lifted language may be further complicated in
situations in which briefs look to resources like the opinions below for their language,
simply re-framing it in a most favorable light. See, e.g., Justin Wedeking, Supreme Court
Litigants and Strategic Framing, 54 AM. J. POLITICAL SCI. 617 (2010).
296. There is a small body of scholarship looking specifically at judicial plagiarism, but
it is primarily focused on the copyright implications of the practice and its use by the lower
courts. See, e.g., Douglas R. Richmond, Unoriginal Sin: The Problem of Judicial
Plagiarism, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1077 (2013); Carol M. Bast & Linda B. Samuels, Plagiarism
and Legal Scholarship in the Age of Information Sharing: The Need for Intellectual
Honesty, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 777 (2008); Gerald Lebovits, Alifya V. Curtin & Lisa
Solomon, Ethical Judicial Opinion Writing, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 237 (2008); Jaime
S. Dursht, Judicial Plagiarism: It May Be Fair Use but Is It Ethical? 18 CARDOZO L. REV.
1253 (1996).
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concerns about the source of the shared language. If there is a
repeat litigator in the Court who is expected to present accurate
information and who is held to a lofty standard, that litigator is
the government’s attorney—the SG. Nonetheless, the SG is also
an advocate who makes arguments to win cases. Furthermore,
the government may have an agenda in a case that does not
coincide with the best interest of justice or of the rule of law. If
the SG frames arguments to win cases, then the language used
may be stronger or more argumentative than we would expect
from an agnostic party or from the Court itself.
Although the SG’s argument and statements of fact, or
those of any other similarly situated litigator, may be accurate,
the level of accuracy expected from these parties does not
parallel that expected from the Court. Thus, there may be certain
professional and societal expectations of due diligence in
checking the law and the facts on the part of the Justices and the
clerks that is not equally expected from others. This is not to say
that such due diligence does not occur in circumstances with
unattributed language sharing; it is only to say that the lack of
attribution raises questions about the level of due diligence
performed.295
The normative question of when a citation in a Supreme
Court opinion is proper or expected is primarily untapped.296 Yet
because it sits at the apex of the judicial hierarchy, the Supreme
Court and its opinions are not reviewed by other judicial bodies
that could fashion norms and expectations for this practice. We
should in consequence examine the practice more closely.
Further research might demonstrate that there are reasons why
the Justices may want to provide citations when there are clear
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sources—reasons including the potential positive effect that
those citations could have on perceptions of the Court’s
institutional legitimacy.297
Further research into the possibility that large-scale
language borrowing is idiosyncratic to particular Justices might
also be productive. Justice Blackmun authored more than half of
the Lifted opinions revealed by my research.298 This may
indicate that he, more than other Justices, was willing to directly
adopt the language of the briefs.299 Still, many other Justices in
the time period of the study authored Lifted opinions, and if the
word-number threshold for Lifted opinions was loosened, this
number would grow considerably.
As one team of commentators aptly wrote, “There is much
to be learned from studies that compare a judicial opinion with
the briefs and trial transcripts and other materials on which the
judge based—or purported or was expected to base—his
opinion.”300 Awareness of the practice of large-scale language
borrowing may help bring clarity to this part of the process of
opinion construction. Still, the rules for drafting opinions when
they are primarily based on contentions made in merits briefs are
unscripted. Supreme Court opinion writing is a unique enterprise
that may deserve deference not afforded to other types of
writing. By removing the mystery that obscures this part of the
opinion-construction process, however, we may begin to
develop expectations for the role that briefs should play in it.
And we may also begin to assess the significance, if any, that we
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297. See generally, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A
PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2006) (describing the many audiences that may
affect Supreme Court Justices’ behavior and why the Justices likely care about the opinions
of these audiences).
298. Cf. Tony Mauro, Lifting the Veil: Justice Blackmun’s Papers and the Public
Perception of the Supreme Court, 70 MO. L. REV. 1037 (2005) (describing Justice
Blackmun’s other uncommon behaviors as a Justice).
299. Although this might be accurate at the level of particular cases, the average
percentage of overlapping language between briefs and Justice Blackmun’s opinions is not
high compared to the other Justices. See Feldman, supra note 5 (showing that the mean
overlap value across the 1946 through 2013 terms is 9.54 percent, and that Justice
Blackmun’s mean overlap value is just above average at 9.90 percent).
300. LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM W. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF
FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 52
(2013).
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place on attribution to briefs when opinions adopt their
substantive language.
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